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POTLATCH EDUCATION
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ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS )
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, XN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
POTLATCH EDUCATION
1
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS, )
Plaintiff,
v.

1
1
1

Case No.
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY
AND INSONCTNE RELIEF

)
)
)
)

POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285,

1

Defendants.

)
)

Plaintiffs Potlatch Education Association and Doug Richards, by and though their
attorneys of record, John E. &Inel, Esq., James M. Piotrowski, Esq., and Marti Durand, Esq.,
allege and aver their Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against Defendants
Potlatch School District No. 285 and Board of Trustees,

COhfPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVEl?.EL.IEF - 1

000004

.

PARTIES
1.

Plaintiff Potlatch Education Association ("PEA") is a local education association

which is an unincorporated associated located in Potlatch, Idaho. Plaintiff Doug Richards is a
teacher in Potlatch School District No. 285, and also resides in Potlatch, Idaho.
2.

Defendant Potlatch School District No. 285 ("School District") is a corporate and

political body recognized and existing under the laws of the State of Idaho. Defendant Board of
Trustees, Potlatch School District No. 285 ("School Board") is the governing board of the School
District:
FACTS GIVING RISE TO THE COMPLAINT
3.

On or about November 16, 2006, the PEA and the School Board entered into a

Master Agreement which govern the terms and conditions of employment for School District
professional employees for the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 school years. Specifically, the Master
Agreement contains a provision, at Article X, Paragraph 10.5, providing for "Professional
Leave," which states as follows:
Attendance at educational meetings or visiting other schools is permitted at M l
pay if such absence is approved by tbe Principal. If any certillcated personnel
wishes to be absent from duty for a brief period to attend a professional meeting,
to visit schools, or otherwise pursue professional development, a written request
for approval of such absence should be signed by the Principal and filed in the
Superintendent's office at least two (2) days prior to the first day of anticipated
absence. Professional leave is not to exceed two (2) days per year and is noncumulative. The Principal may make exceptions on the number of days allowed
when necessary.
4.

The Master Agreement, at Article V11, contains a non-binding Grievance

Procedure for resolvilsg disputes concerning the misinterpretation or misapplication of any
provision of the Master Agreement.

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTNE RELIEF - 2

5.

Sometime prior to May 3,2007, Richards requested professional leave to travel to

and defend his final project for his Master's Degree in Education from the University of Idaho.
The School District allowed Richards to take leave, but classified the leave as a personal leave
day, rather than a professional leave day.

6.

On or about June 7,2007, the PEA and Richards filed a grievance with the School

District requesting that the School District reclassify Richards' May 3, 2007 leave day as
professional, rather than personal, leave. The School District denied the PEA and Richards'
grievance both at the illitial level and at each subsequent step of the grievance process.
7:

On October 11, 2007, the REA mil Richards, through their representatives,

informed the School District that the PEA and Richards intended to pursue litigation concerning
the grievance, but would forego doing so if the School Distiict agreed to resolve matters through
binding arbitration. By letter dated October 12, 2007, the School District declined the PEA and
Richards' invitation to resolve the matter through binding arbib-ation.
8.

A dispute has arisen between the REA and Richards on the one hand and the

School District on the other hand concerning the meaning of the Professional Leave provision
and the PEA and Richards' rights under the provision. The PEA and Richards contend that
Richards' defehse of his Master's project qualifies for Professional Leave under the Master
Agreement, while the School District contends that it does not. A judicial determination on this
issue is necessary &d appropriate so the parties can determine their respective rights and
obligations under the Master Agreement.

In addition, injunctive relief is necessary and

appropriate to prevent further hann to the PEA and Richards caused by the School Diskict's
refusal to classify Richards' May 3, 2007 leave as professional leave and to prevent the School
Distxict froin classifying similar leave taken by School District teachers and professional

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORYAND INJUNCTIVERELXEF - 3

.@f,I@,o%

employees as personal leave in the future.
INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE
The PEA and Richards incorporate each and every allegation alleged above into

9.

each and every claim for relief alleged below.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
[Breach of Contract -- Count I]
As quoted above, the PEA and the School Board entered into a written agreement

10.

providing that professional leave must be grgrmtedto School District employees under specified
circumstances.

The School District and School Board breached the Professional Leave

provisions of the Master Agreement by classifying the leave taken by Richards on May 3, 2007
to defend his Master's project as personal, rather than professional, leave.
WHEREFORE, the PEA seeks relief as set forth more fully below.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
[Breach of Contract -- Count TI]
11.

By operation of law ald the express provision of Richards' individual teaching

contract, the terms and provisions of the Master Agreement modified and becane part of
Richards' employment contract with the School District. By breaching the Professional Leave
provisions of the Master Agreement by refusing to classify Richards' May 3, 2007 leave as
professional leave, the School District, in turn, breached its employment contract with Richards.
W'HEREFORF, Richards seeks relief as more fully set forth below.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The PEA and Richards pray for judgment against the School District and School Board as

COMPLAlNT FOR DECLATUTORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF - 4

follows:
For declaratory and equitable orders declaring that the School District and School

1.

Board breached the Professional Leave provisions of the Master Agreement by failing to classify
Richards' May 3, 2007 leave to defend his Master's project as professional leave, rather than
personal leave;

2.

For injunctive relief requiring the School District to reclassify Richards' May 3,

2007 leave from personal leave, to professional leave, and prohibiting the School District from
classifying similar leave taken by School District professional employees as personal, rather than
professional, leave in the future;
3.

For a11award of costs, including reasonable attorney's fees allowable under Idaho

law; and
4.

For such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.

DATED h i s -fray of December, 2007.

DAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION

A

By:
John E. Rumel
Attorney for Plaintiff Potlatch Education
Association and Doug Richards

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF - 5

Brian K. Julian - ISB No. 2 3 6 0
Amy G. White - ISB No. 5019
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 7 0 0
Post Office Box 7 4 2 6
Boise; Idaho 8 3 7 0 7 - 7 4 2 6
Telephone: (208) 3 4 4 - 5 8 0 0
Facsimile:
(208) 344-551 0
E-Mail: biulian@aihlaw.com
awhite@aihlaw.com
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Attorneys for DEFENDANTS
IN THE DlSTRlCT COURT OF
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

POTLATCH EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS,

Case No. CV 2007-1 15 1

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

Plaintiff(s1,

1

VS.

Fee Category: I ( ?)(a)
Fee: $58.00

POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285,
Defendant(s1.
I

TO: PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR ATTORNEY OF RECORD:
I

YOU AND EACH OF YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the
undersigned hereby appears as counsel of record for Defendants the aboveentitled action.

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 1

The Defendants hereby specifically reserve all defenses as t o lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, lack of jurisdiction over the person,
improper venue, insufficiency o f process andlor service o f process, failure t o
state a claim upon which relief can be granted,

failure t o join an

indispensable party and any other defense available t o said Defendants
DATED this

&day of January, 2008.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL

Attorneys for Defendants
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LLP

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

rz/

day of, January 2008, 1 served a
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEARANCE b y
delivering the same t o each of the following attorneys of record, by the
method indicated below, addressed as follows:
John E. Rurnel
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION

620 North 2638
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 333-8560
Facsimile: (208) 344-1 606
James M. Piotrowski
Marty Durand
HERZFELD & PIOTROWSKI, LLP

71 3 West Franklin Street
P.O. Box 2864
Boise, Idaho 83701-2864
Telephone: (208) 331-9200
Facsimile: (208) 331-9201
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Overnight Mail
Facsimile

[
[

]
]

[

]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

1

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

[.y'

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL D i
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 0

,

T

F

PK 12: 00

CLEM OF D?STRlC;TMsllRT
L/&iPPHCOUNTY
BY
"-...
Case No.CV- 2007-1 151

J ~ E ~ T

POTLATCH EDUCAT~ONASSOCIATION AND DOUG
RICHARDS

PLAINTIFF(S)

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

VS

POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO 285 and BOARD
OF TRUSTEES, POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO
285

DEFENDANT(S)
State of Idaho
County of Kootena~

1, ROD JOHNSON, being duly sworn, deposeand say: 1 have-been duly authorized to make service of
document(s) listed herein and 1 am over the age of eighteen and not a party to or otherwise interested in this
matter.
On 1211912007 I received the following documents: SUMMONS & COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY
/.XD NJUb!CTIVE RELIEP for t_heabove captionedection.

On 12/2012007 at 3 5 5 PM, I executed service of the documents as follows:
SERVICE ON POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO 285 and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POTLATCH
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO 285 at the District Office by leaving documents with an individual over the age of 18
therein, who identified herself as GWEN B U m R D T who stated that she was authorized to accept service of
court documents oil behalf of the school district and the Board of Trustees.
SERVICE ADDRESS: POTLATCIJ SCI4OOL DISTRICT 285 OFFICES, POTLATCH. ID 83855

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN

RETURN PROOF OF SERVICE

-5 .
'

' - 0 "

.. --

My Commission Expires:

1 \* 7,5--\5

John E. Rumel, Esq.
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
620 North Sixth Street
P.O. Box 2638
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 333-8560
Facsimile: (208) 344-1606
James M. Piotrowski, Esq.
Marty Durand, Esq.
HERZFELD & PIOTROWSKI, LLP
713 West Franklin Street
P.O. Box 2864
Boise, Idaho 83701-2864
Telephone: (208) 33 1-9200
Facsimile: (208) 33 1-9201
Attovneys fov Plaintzffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDANO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

1
POTLATCH EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS, )

Case No.

1

Plaintiff,

SUMMONS

V.

POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285,

1
)

1
)

1
I

Defendants.

TO:

1

THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285 and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 285:
You are hereby notified that in order to defend this lawsuit, an appropriate written

response must be filed with the above-designated court within 20 days after servke of this
Summons on you. If you fail to so respond the court may enter judgment against you as

SUMMONS - I

!A!
OWBGBPiimi

RETURN TO COURT

:.,

@d~013

demanded by the Plaintiff in the Complaint.

A copy of the Complaint is served with this S m o n s . If you wish to seek the advice or
representation by an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that your written
response, if any, may be filed in time and other legal rights protected.
An appropriate written response requires compliance with Rule 10(a)(l) and other Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure and shall also include:

1.

The title and number of this case.

2.

If your response is an Answer to the Complaint, it must contain admissions or

denials ofthe separate allegatio~lsof the Complaint and other defenses you may claim.
3.

Your signature, inailing address and telephone number, or the signature, mailing

address and telephone number of your attorney.
4.

Proof of mailing or delivery of a copy of your response to plaintiffs attorney, as

designated above.
To determine whether you must pay a filing fee with your response, contact the Clerk of
the above-named court.
DATED this

dday of December, 2007.
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

By:
DEPUTY CLERK

SUMMONS - 2

Brian K. Julian - ISB No. 2360
Amy G. White - ISB No. 5019
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
~ o i s e Idaho
,
83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile: (208) 344-5510
E-Mail: biulian@aihlaw.com
awhite@aihlaw.com

2IMEa:Jfg
.!

6.g: 02

CLERK OF ~$ST~!Q
GQU~~:
~O~gry
@~---.--...,@&J~EPuTA/

Attorneys for DEFENDANTS
INTHE USTRICT COURT OF
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
POTLATCH EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS.

Case No. CV 2007-1 151
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285,

COME NOW defendants Potlatch School District No. 285, and Board of
Trustees, Potlatch School District NO. 285, by and through their attorneys of
record, Anderson Julian & Hull, LLP and file the following answer as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE

Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
SECOND DEFENSE
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1

.

000015

Defendants deny each and every allegation not herein expressly and
specifically admitted.
THIRD DEFENSE

Answering Paragraph 1 of plaintiffs' Complaint, defendants are without
knowledge of the allegations contained within the same and therefore deny the
same.

.~

... .

.

~

~

~.

.

.

~

. .. . .

.

Answering Paragraph 2 of plaintiffs' ~omplajnt,'defendants' admit the
allegations contained within the same.

Answering Paragraphs 3 and 4 of plaintiffs' Complaint, defendants admit
that a Master Agreement was entered into which speaks for itself. Defendants
deny the remaining allegations of said paragraphs

Answering Paragraph 5 of plaintiffs' Complaint, defendants deny each and
every allegation contained within the same.

5.
Answering Paragraph 6 of plaintiffs' Complaint, defendants admit that a
grievance was filed which was denied. The defendants deny each and every
remaining allegation of said paragraph.

-

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 2

Answering Paragraphs 7 and 8 of plaintiffs' Complaint, defendants deny
each and every allegation contained within the same.

7.
Answering Paragraph 9 of the plaintiffs' Complaint, defendants repeat and
reallege each of their answers as if fully incorporated herein.

8.
Answering Paragraphs 10 and ?I
of plaintiffs' Complaint, defendants deny
each and every allegation contained therein.

F(~~-;I;H
DE&NSE

~

Plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facia case supporting their claims
as required by law.
FIFTH DEFENSE

The damages prayed for in the complaint and the causes of action against
said defendants arise out of, and stem from, activities that are immune liability
and, therefore, plaintiffs' causes of action and the damages alleged are barred.
SIXTH DEFENSE

Plaintiff, through his own actions or omissions, has waived any right to the
causes of action pled in his Complaint andlor is estopped from pursuing them
against the defendants.
SEVENTHDEFENSE

Plaintiffs' claims are barred, in whole or in part, through the doctrines of
waiver, latches, andfor unclean hands.
EIGHTH DEFENSE

-

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 3

The defendants have complied with each and every term of any contracts
entered into with plaintiff, and/or plaintiff is in breach of conditions and
requirements under said contracts, thereby resolving defendants of any liability.
NINTH DEFENSE
lnsofar as the Complaint seeks Declaratory Relief, it is alleged that said
Complaint is seeking a declaration based upon speculation regarding some
future event which may or may not occur.
TEETHDEFENSE
~.~

Insofar as the complaint seeksDeclaratory Relief, it is alleged that there
I

exists oth'er effective and appropriate remedies which would provide the relief
requested.
ELEVENTHDEFENSE
lnsofar as the Complaint seeks Declaratory Relief, it is alleged that a
judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate any uncertainty
of controversy giving rise to this proceeding.
TWELVETH DEFENSE
lnsofar as the Complaint seeks Declaratory Relief, it is alleged that the
issues claimed are moot.
THIRTEENTH DEFENSE
lnsofar as the Complaint is seeking Injunctive Relief, it is alleged the
Complaint does not show or allege the likelihood of future injury or irreparable
harm.
FOURTEENTHDEFENSE

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4

Insofar as the Complaint is seeking Injunctive Relief, it is alleged that there
has been a failure to provide any security for costs as required by Rule 65(c) of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

FIFTEENTH DEFENSE
Any and all claims for attorney's fees are controlled by the definition set
forth in I.C. 12-117.

SIXTEENTH DEFENSE
Defendants reserve the right to assert any additional affirmative defenses,
or matters, and avoidance that may be disclosed or discovered in the course of
additional investigation and discovery.
WHEREFORE, defendants pray that plaintiffs take nothing by way of their
Complaint, that the same be dismissed, that the request made by plaintiffs be
denied, and that the defendants be awarded their cost of suit, attorney fees, and
such other and further relief as this Court deems just and appropriate.

DEFENDANTS HEREBY DEMAND A TRIAL BY JURY.
DATED thir&%ay

of January, 2008.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP

Attorneys for Defendants

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 5

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

a

h

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of, January 2008, 1 served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL by delivering the same to each of the following
attorneys of record, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:
John E. Rumel
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
620 North 2638
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 333-8560
Facsimile: (208) 344-1606

[ j
[ 1
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

James M. Piotrowski
Marty Durand
HERZFELD & PIOTROWSKI, LLP
713 West Franklin Street
P.O. Box 2864
Boise, Idaho 83701-2864
Telephone: (208) 331-9200
Facsimile: (208) 331-9201

[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

Overnight Mail

-

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 6

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

~~

POTLATCH EDUCATION' . . . . . . I . .
ASSOCIAlTON and DOUG RICHARDS, )
'

~

Plaintiffs,

1
1
1
)

vs.
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285,
Defendants.

.

.~ .

Case No. CV-07-01153
ORDER SETTING PLANNING AND
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE
RULE 16(b)

)

1

)
)

i

Pursuant to Rule 16@), I.R.C.P., it is ORDERED that a planning and scheduling
conference be conducted by telephone conference caU, to be initiated by the Court, at 9:30
A.M., March 3,2008, at which time all counsel for the respective parties shall be available
to participate in the conference call.

At such planning and scheduling conference counsel for each party shall be fully
prepared to:
(a) Advise the Court whether it is contemplated that it will be necessary to join
additional parties;
(?J) Advise the Court whether or not the filing of amended pleadings is

ORDER SETTING PLANNING AND
SCHEDULING COrnRENCE - 1

contemplated;
(c) Advise the Court as to the status of discovery and what, if any, additional
discovery is contemplated by any party;
(d) Advise the Court whether or not such party contemplates the filing of any
additiovlal pretrial motions, including but not limited .to, motions for summary judgment;
(e) Discuss dates for the filing of amended pleadings and/or pretrial motions and
the completion of discove~;
(f) Discuss dates for Rule 16 pretrial conference or conferences;

(g) Discuss the possibilities of settlement;

, . . ~.

...~.

.~

. . .

,

.... ..

,

,

.

(h) Discuss the fixing of a time or times for hearing of pending pretrial motions;
(i) Discuss the fixing of a trial date;
(j) Discuss any other matters appropriate iri the circumstances of the case, including

th; expeditious disposition of the above entitled action.
PROVIDED, however, that counsel wilI not be required to attend the conference if
they file with the clerk of the Court, at least five (5) days prior to the conference, a
stipulation covering all of the above matters. Should the stipulation not be satisfactory to
the court, a new date for the conference will be ordered.
In the event that counsel for any party is unable to participate in such planning and
scheduling conference because of prior co&t commitments on the date above schedul'ed,it
is the duty of such counsel to contact the Cowt and opposing counsel and arrange a
mutually satisfactory date to which the matter wilI be continued.
DATED this

of February, 2008.

JO& R. Stegner'
District Judge

ORDER SETTING PLANNING AND
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE - 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
T- do herebv certrfy that a full,

true and coriect copy of the foregoing
ORDER SETTING PLANNING AND SCHEDULING
CONFERENCE RULE 16(b)was mailed to:

-

Brian I<. Julian
Attorney at Law
PO Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426
James M. Piotrowski
Attorney at Law
PO Box 2864
Boise, ID 83701-2864
I

I

I
I

John E. Rumel
Attorney at Law
620 North 2638
Boise, ID 83701

OWER SETTING PLANNING AND
SCHEDrnING CONFERENCE - 3

@v~oDIPJI 51

c\SE M i j ...
Brian K.. Julian - IS5 No. 2360
Amy G. White - ISB No. 5019
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 7 0 0
Post Office Box 7 4 2 6
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
( 2 0 8 ) 344-551 0
E-Mail: bjulian@ajhlaw.com
awhite@ajhlaw.com

Zg@FEB ( 9 P&i2:53
CLERK GF ~i$?;{%cr;.[
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..... ..

.

Cio\jWTy

&QEFU:V

. .-

I.
,.
,.

Attorneys for DEFENDANTS

~~

.

.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE SECOND--JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

POTLATCH EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS,

Case No. CV 2007-1 1 5 1

vs.

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF
DISCOVERY DOCUMENTS

POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285,

I

TO:

THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:

YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the

1 2 day of

February, 2008.,

Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Anderson, Julian & Hull LLP,
served a copy of DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY DOCUMENTS

-7

.

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, together w i t h a copy o f this

Notice;upon

counsel for the Plaintiffs, b y first-class mail, postage prepaid, and

addressed to; by fax transmission to; b y overnight delivery to; or b y personally
delivering t o or leaving w i t h a person in charge of the office as indicated below:
John Rumel
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
6 2 0 North Sixth Street
PO Box 2 6 3 8
Boise, ID 8 3 7 0 1
208-333-8560
~.~

.

~~

.

......

]

[

]

I

[X 1

[
[
[

]

1

]
[X ]

.,/

dT

U.S. Mail,
repaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile 208-344-1 6 0 6

.. .

~

James Piotrowski
HERZFELD & PIOTROWSKI
7 1 3 West Franklin Street
PO Box 2 8 6 4
Boise, ID 8 3 7 0 1 -2864
2 0 8 - 3 3 1- 9 2 0 0

I

[
[

~ - G - Brian
5 K.5Julian

NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY DOCUMENTS - 2

.

- ..

U.S. ail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile 2081331 - 9 2 0 1

.-

1 Y

DF t'%lQiCT CO!IRT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL D I & % L ~ @ ~ T ~
EY-.--" ..- . &PIJTY
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAJ3
POTLATCH EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS, )
%

Plaintiffs,

1

Case No. CV-07-01151
SCHEDULING ORDER

1

VS.

\

POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285,
Defendants.

)

1
)

1
1

As the result of a n informal planning and scheduling.conference conducted by
telephone confere~nceon March 3, 2008, with counsel for each of the respective parties
participating, the Court enters the following ORDERS:
(1) Plaintiffs' opening brief must be filed and served no Iater than March 31,2008;

(2) The response brief shall be senred and filed no later than April 14,2008;
(3) The reply brief, if any, shall be served and filed no later than April 28,2008; and

(4) Oral argument is set to commence at 10:00 ~.1\k.on May 5,2008, in Courtroom
#3 of the Latah County Courthouse.

DATED this

3%

of March, 2008.

~ o h n kStegner
.
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certdy that a full, true, complete and
correct copies of the foregoing SCHEDULING ORDER
was mailed to:
Brian K. JuIian
Attorney at Law
PO Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426
James M. Piotrowski
Attorney at Law
PO Box 2864
Boise, ID 83701-2864
John E. Rumel
Attorney at Law
Box 2638
Boise, ID 83701
I

I

on this

___
LC day of March, 2008

John E. Rumel, Esq.
DAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
620 North Sixth Street
P.O. Box 2638
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 333-8560
Facsimile: (208) 344-1606

2088I9WR 17 WHJ1:43
CLERK OF G!STRICT COURT

James M. Piotrowski, Esq.
Marty Durand, Esq.
ElERZFELD & PIOTROWSKI, LLP
713 West Franklin Street
P.O. Box 2864
Boise, Idaho 83701-2864
Telephone: (208) 33 1-9200
Facsimile: (208) 33 1-9201
Attorneys fov P1aintzJ.s

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
POTLATCH EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS,
Plaintiff,

1

1
1
1

1
1

V.

Case No. CV2007-1151
NOTICE OF SERVICE

)

POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285,
Defendants.

1
1
1
1
1
1

I hereby certify that on the 11'' day of March, 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, REQUESTS FOR
ADMISSION, AND INTERROGATORIES TO DEFENDANTS to be served via facsimile

NOTICE OF SERVICE - 1

transmission on:
Amy White, Esq.
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Facsimile: 344-5510
of March, 2008.
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
I

By:
Attorney for Plaintiff Potlatch Education
Association and Doug Richards

NOTICE OF SERVICE - 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the &ay
copy of the foregoing to be served via:
U.S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivered

to:
A n y White, Esq.
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Facsimile: 344-55 10

NOTICE OF SERVICE - 3

of March, 2008, I caused a W e and correct

Brian K . Julian - ISB No. 2360
Amy G. White IS8 No. 5019
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W, Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suits 7 0 0
Post Office Box 7 4 2 6
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208)344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-5510
E-Mail: biulian@aihIaw.com
awhite@ajhIaw.com

-

CLERK OF DISTRICT COUi(S
LATA OUNTY

BY_--..-

&

BEPUTY

A t t o r n e y s for DEFENDANTS.
.

1N THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE SEc0N6;lWDIClAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF U T A H

~

POTLATCH EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS,
Plaintiff (s),

Case No. C V 2007- 1 151

STIPULATION TO CONTINUE
HEARING DATE

vs.

POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285, a n d BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285.

COME NOW The Plainriffs and Defendants, by and Through their
counsel o f record,

and based upon t h e following information,

hereby

stipulate a n d agree that after the, soheduliny conference of M o n d a y , March
3, 2008, counsel for the parties have further disoussed this case and have

determined that additional time for discovery is needed in order .lo insure that
STIPULATION TO CONTINUE HEARING DATE -I

25-20-2008
.
.
" ..--,

.

- W E . , .

03,/13/I1B

-..--.

FROM-HERZFELD P L .OIVSKI

02:23PM
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LL.

d.J

LL(DJLiLI1
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7

_,
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WIZtOON,

IEA LESAL SERVI...
JUbxm. $ HULL

~

5

L

ell relevant evidence is disoovered and produced. The parties

are therefore

requesting that t h e ourrent hearing date in rhis maner of May 6, 2008, be
reset by this Wonarabia Court ta a dare in June or July of ZOOS, wirh the

rel~ventbriefing schedules changed
time.

DATED this

a+-day

TO

cortcI8Te the

new hearing date

and

of March, 2008.

ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP

Idaho Educmlon A~lsoclarlon

~ John
v ~E. Rumel
- s 2 ~ >
WERZFELD & PIOTROWSKI, LLP

STIPULATION TO CONTINUE HEARING DATE -2

/'
1

.g3-2p-2008
,.< . ..

-

DZ:23PId

FROM-KERZFELD P

I',,

,OWSKI
..

,

CERTIFICATE OF M A W

w

day of, March 2008, 1 served a
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h i s
t r u e and correct copy of the foregoing STIPULATION TO CONTINUE
HEARING DATE by delivering rhe s a m e to each of the following attorneys of
record, by the method indicated below, addressed a s i o l l ~ w s :
John E. Rurnel

[

I

IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
6 2 0 North 2638
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: ( 2 0 8 ) 333-8560
Facsimile: ( 2 0 8 ) 344-1606

[
[

1

J a m e s M. Piotrowslci
Marty Durand
HERZFELD & PIOTROWSKI, LLP
7 1 3 West Franklin S ~ r e a t
P.O. Box 2864
Boise, Idaho 83702 -2864
Telephone: (208) 331- 9 2 0 0
Facsimile: ( 2 0 8 ) 331-9201

[

1

Overnight Mail
k/ Facsimile

[
[

f
[

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

]

1
]

/l/

STIPULATION TO CONTINUE HEARING DATE -3

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

.

I
I

.

..

...,

S-

& OB~SSNAL
Brian K. Julian - ISB No. 2360
Amy G. White - ISB No. 5019
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile: (208) 344-5510
E-Mail:
biulian@,aihlaw.com
awhite@aihlaw.com
Attorneys for DEFENDANTS
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
POTLATCH EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
and DOUG RICHARDS,
Case No. CV 2007-1 151
Piaintiff(s),

vs ,

POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO 285,
and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POTLATCH
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 285

ORDER VACATING AND
RESETTING HEARING DATE

Upon Stipulation of the parties and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, and this does order, adjudge
and decree that the hearing currently set for May 5, 2008 be vacated and reset to
June 9, 2008 at 10:OO a.m.
DATED this

Zft t"^
day of March, 2008.

-

ORDER VACATING AND RESETTING HEARING DATE I

,

0861031'8

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

a

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of March, 2008, 1 served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Order Vacating and Resetting Hearing by delivering
the same to each of the following attorneys of record, by the method indicated
below, addressed as follows:
John E. Rumel
Idaho Education Association
P.0, Box 2638
Boise, ID 83701
James M. Piotrowski
Marty Durand
Herzfeld & Piotrowski
P.O. Box 2864
Boise, ID 83701
Brian K. Julian
Anderson Julian & Hull
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707

nDnER

[<
[ ]
[ ]
[ 1

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facs~mile

U.S.Mail, postage prepaid
[
[
[

]
]

1

Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

[A U.S.mail, postage prepaid
[

]

[

]

[

]

Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

-

VACATING AND RESETTING HEARING DATE 2

John E. Rumel, Esq.
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
620 North Sixth Street
P.O. Box 2638
Boise, ID 83701
Telephol~e:(208) 333-8560
Facsimile: (208) 344-1606

CLERK .OFDiSTRIGI COURT

James N. Piotrowskci, Esq.
Marty Durand, Esq.
HERZFELD & PIOTROWSKI, LLP
713 West Franklin Street
P.O. Box 2864
Boise, Idaho 83701-2864
Telephone: (208) 33 1-9200
Facsimile: (208) 33 1-9201
Attorneys fir Plaiiztzffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND .JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAW
POTLATCH EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS,
Plaintiff,

POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285,
Defendants.

1
1
1

Case No. CV2007-I 151

1
1

NOTICE OF SERVICE

1
1
1
1
1

I hereby certify that on the lStday of April, 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO DEFENDMTS' FBST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION to be served via hand delivery on:

Amy White, Esq.
Anderson, Julian & Hull, P;LP
C W Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
of April, 2008.
DATED this &+dlay

IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION

By:

k

John E. Rumel
Attorney for plaintiff potlatch Education
Association and Doug Richards

CERTFICATROF SERVICE

I HEREBY C E R T W That on the &qay
copy of the foregoing to be served via:
U.S. Mail

A-

Facsimile Transmission

Hand Delivered
to:

Amy White, Esq.
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Facsimile: 344-5510

NOTTCE OF SERVICE - 3

of Aprrl, 2 0 0 8 1 caused a tme and correct

.. .

,

.

,

..

,

. . . .. .

(r

.',)

.. .

CASENO. t1/-07
/IS)
Brian K. Julian - ISB No. 2 3 6 0
A m y G. White - ISB No. 501 9
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
2 5 0 South Fifth Street, Suite 7 0 0
Post Office Box 7 4 2 6
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-551 0
E-Mail: bjulian@ajhlaw.com
awhite@ajhlaw.com
Attorneys for DEFENDANTS
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

POTLATCH EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS,

Case No. C V 2007-1 151

Plaintiff(s),
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF
DISCOVERY DOCUMENTS

VS.

POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285,
Defendant(s).

TO:

THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTfTLED COURT:

YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the &>ay

of April, 2008..

Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Anderson, Julian & Hull LLP,
served a copy of DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR

RtnTll'F

OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY DOCUMENTS

-

1

I
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PRODUCTION

OF

DOCUMENTS,

REQUEST

FOR

ADMISSION

AND

INTERROGATORIES, together with a copy of this Notice, upon counsel for the
Piaintiffs, b y first-class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to; by fax
transmission to; by overnight delivery to; or by personally delivering to or
leaving with a person in charge of the office as indicated below:

I
I

I

John Rumel
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
620 North Sixth Street
PO Box 2 6 3 8
Boise, ID 83701
208-333-8560

[ x]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile 208-344-1 606

James Piotrowski

[ x]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile 208-331 -9201

HERZFELD & PlOTROWSKl
71 3 West Franklin Street
PO Box 2 8 6 4
Boise, ID 83701-2864
208-331 - 9 2 0 0

I

I

RlnTICF

O F SERVICE

OF DISCOVERY DOCUMENTS - 2

John E. Rumel, Esq.
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
620 North Sixth Street
P.O. Box 2638
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 333-8560
Facsimile: (208) 344-1606
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CLERK OF aiSTRtCT C Q ~ J ~ T
LATAH COLiNTY
*il

"1

+--:-DEP~JTY

James M. Piotrowski, Esq.
Marty Durand, Esq.
HERZFELD & PIOTROWSKT, LLP
713 West Franklin Street
P.O. Box 2864
Boise, Idaho 83701-2864
Telephone: (208) 33 1-9200
Facsimile: (208) 331-920 1
Attorneys fur Plazntiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND RJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
POTLATCH EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS,
Plaintiff,
v.

POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285,
Defendants.

1
)

1
1
1
1
1

Case No. CV2007-1151
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
ST=
DEFENDANTS'
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY
JURY

1
1

1

Plaintiffs Potlatch Education Association and Doug Richards move for an Order from this
Court striking Defendants' Potlatch School District No. 285 and Board of Trustees, Potlatch
School District No. 285's (collectively, "School District") demand for trial by jury set forth in
their Answer and Demand for Trial by Jury. The PEA and Richards bring their motion on the

PI

ATNTFFS' MOTION TO STRLKE DEFENDANTS' DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY - 1'

00OO4f

grounds that they have sought only equitable relief, and not damages, in their Complaint and
that, under Idaho law, hial by jury is not available in actions that are solely equitable in nature.
The PEA and Richards' motion is supported by a memorandun filed concurrently
herewith.
?%y
DATED this -

of May, 2008.
IDAE-IO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION

P
By:
John E. Rurnel
Attomev
,for Plaintiff Potlatch Education
Association and Doug Richards
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
q%ay
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the ___
copy of the foregoing to be served via:

of May, 22008, 1caused a true and correct

U.S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivered
to:
Brim K. Julial, Esq.
Davis VanderVelde, Esq.
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Facsimile: 344-55 10

PLAWTLFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS' DEMANn FOR TRIAL BY JURY - 3

0 00 04 3

Johll E. Rurnel, Esq.
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCUTION
620 North Sixth Street
P.O. Box 2638
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 333-8560
Facsimile: (208) 344-1606
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I

I

Janles M. Piotrowski, Esq.
Mariy Durand, Esq.
HERZFELD & PIOTROWSKI, LLP
713 West Franlclin Street
P.O. Box 2864
Boise, Idaho 83701-2864
Telephone: (208) 331-9200
Facsimile: (208) 331-9201
Attorneys for Plaintgs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF LDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
POTLATCH EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICBARDS,

1
1

Case No. CV2007-1151

Plaintiff,

1

1
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285.

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
STRIKE DEFENDANTS'
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION
In their Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Defendants Potlatch School
District No. 285 and Board of Trustees, Potlatch School District No. 285 (collectively "School
District") have demanded a trial by jury. However, as discussed more fully below, Plaintiffs

0130044
PT,AINTFFS' MEMORANDUM a\T SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE,ETC.- 1

Potlatch Education Association ("'PEA") and Doug Richards have sought equitable relief, not
damages, and Idaho law makes clear that claims seeking solely equitable relief are triable to the
Court, not to a jury. For these reasons, the School District's demand for trial by jury should and
must be stricken.
11. ARGUMENT

A.

Based on Well-Settled Idaho Law, the School District's Demand for Trial by Jury
Must be Stricken.
Idaho appellate courts have made clear that where a plaintiff, in a declaratory relief action

or otherwise, seeks only equitable relief and not damages, h e issues are triable to the court, not
to a jw. Thomas v. Schmelzer, 118 Idaho 353, 361, 796 P.2d 1026, I034 (Ct. App. 1990);

Temperance Irzs. &change v. Cawer, 83 Idaho 487,493,365 P.2d si4,827 (1961).
The PEA and Richards have brought two claims for breach of contract against the School
District: Specifically, the PEA and Richards allege that the School District breached the
Professional Leave provisions of the Master Agreement entered into between the PEA and the
School Board and, in turn, breached Richards' indfvidual employme~~t
contract by charging
Richards with use of a personal leave day, rather than granting a professional leave day,
concerning his travel to and defense of his final project for his

aster's thesis in Education at the

University of Idaho. 111their Prayer for Relief, the PEA and Richards have sought declaratory
and equitable relief, not damages, on their claims. Accordingly, under well-settled Idaho law
and because the PEA and Richards have limited the relief requested by them to equitable relief, a
trial on the PEA and Richards' clailns would be to the Court, not to a jyy.

DT A

n\rTTRFS'

MEMORANDUM W SUPPORTOF MOTION TO STRIKE,ETC. - 2
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111. CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons stated above, the PEA and Richards' Motion to Strikc the School
District's demand for trial by jury should and must be granted.

f&J'

DATED this -8ay of May, 2008.
DAHO EDUCATION ASSOClATION

By:
Attorney for Plaintiff Potlatch Education
Association and Doug Richards
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the m a y of May, 2008, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to be served via:
U.S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
.

Hand Delivered

to:
Brian K. Julian, Esq.
Davis VanderVelde, Esq.
Anderson, Julian &Hull, LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 Soutb Fifth Street, Suite 700
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Facsimile: 344-5510
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John E. Rumel, Esq.
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
620 North Sixth Sheet
P.O. Box 2638
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 333-8560
Facsimile: (208) 34/1-1606

CLERK OF GISTRICT CO!,!F!T

James M. Piotrowski, Esq.
Marty Durand, Esq.
HERZFELD & PIOTROWSKI, LLP
7 13 West Franklin Street
P.O. Box 2864
Boise, Idaho 83701-2864
Telephone: (208) 331-9200
Facsimile: (208) 33 1-9201
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTNCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
POTLATCH EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS,

)

1

Case No. CV2007- 115 1

Plaintiff,
)
)

v.

POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285,

Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY SUGDMENT

1
1
1
1
1
1
)

>

Plaintiffs Potlatch Education Association and Doug Ilichards, by and through their
counsel of record, hereby move this Court for Summary Judgment on each and every claim for
relief contained in their Complaint on the grounds that there are no genuine issues of material
fact such that judgment should be granted in their favor and against Defendant Potlatch School

PLAMTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

District No. 285 and Board of Trustees, Potlatch School District No. 285
The PEA and Richards' Motion is brought pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
56(c) and supported by the Affidavits of Doug Richards, Brian Potter and John Rurnel, each with
exhibits attached, as well as by a supporting Memorandum -- all filed concurrently herewith.
G1%ay of May, 2008.
DATED this -

D A H O EDUCATION ASSOCIATION

By:
Attorney for Plaintiff Potlatch Education
Association and Doug Richards

-

PLmTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARYJUDGMENT 2

CERTIKCATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the y*
copy ofthe foregoing to be served via:

of May, 2008, I caused a true and correct

U.S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission

.

Rand Delivered

to:

Brian K. Julian, Esq.
Davis VanderVelde, Esq.
Anderson, Julian & Hull, U P
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Facsimile: 344-5510

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMNiY JUDGMENT - 3

Jobn E. Rumel, Esq.
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCUTION
620 North Sixth Street
P.O. Box 2638
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 333-8560
Facsimile: (208) 344-1606
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James M. Piotrowski, Esq.
Marty Durand, Esq.
HERZFELD & PIOTROWSKI, LLP
713 West Franklin Street
P.O. Box 2864
Boise, Idaho 83701-2864
Telephone: (208) 331-9200
Facsimile: (208) 33 1-9201
Attorneys fov Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTHCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
POTLATCH EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION and DOUG NCHARDS,

1
)

1
1
1
1

Plaintiff,
v.

)

POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285,

Defendants.

1
1
1
1
1
1

Case No. CV2007-1151
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUN
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION
In a decision that can only be viewed as shortsighted and against the interest of all
stakeholders iu. the local community, Defendants Potlatch School District No. 285 and Board of
Trustees, Potlatch School District No. 825 (collectively, "School District") refus'ed to allow
Plaintiff Doug Richards to use a professional leave day to travel to and defend bis final project

---

'--TmK
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for his Master's Degree in Education from the University of Idaho. Certainly, the PEA and
Richards can and do question why the School District would talce a position that impedes, rather
than encourages, its teachers fiom furthering their post-Bachelor's Degree education by
obtaining advanced degrees -- particularly where such professional development will inure to the
benefit of the School District, teachers, and the students that they teach. Moreover, educational
policy and leadership lapses aside, the PEA and Richards will demonstrate below that the School
District's decision to deny Richards' use of professional leave under the above-described
circumstances (which effectively forced him to use a personal leave day) constitutes a breach of
the Professional Leave provisions of the PEA-School Board Master Agreement and, in turn,
constitutes a breach of Richards' individual employment contract with the School District.
For these reasons, this Court should grant the PEA and Richards' motion for summary
i

judgment on its Complaint for two (2) counts of breach of contract and issue declaratory md

I
I

equitable orders requiring the School District to reclassify Richards' leave for defending his &a1
project as professional leave and restore a personal leave day to Richards

11. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Doug Richards is a long-time teacher in the School District. (Affidavit of Doug Richards
in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment ('Richards Aff."),

7 I).

The PEA is a

local education association which, since approximately June 2003, has been the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative for certificated professional employees, including teachers,
in the School District. (Affidavit of Brian Potter in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment ("Potter Aff."),

77 2-5 and 6, Exs. C and D).

During the 2003-2004 school year, the PEA and the Scllool Board negotiated their first
I

Master Agreement. (Id., qq 2-5, Exs. A-C). As part of those negotiations, the PEA proposed that

the parties enter into an agreement regarding professional leave. (Potter Aff., 3 3, Ex. A). The
initial Professioaal Leave language proposed by the PEA provided as follows:

Professional Leave
Attendance at educational meetings or visiting other schools is permitted at full
pay if such absence is approved by the Principal. If any supervisor, principal,
teacher, or other employee wishes to be absent from duty for a brief period to
attend a professional meeting, to visit schools, or for any personal reason wbich is
not an unavoidable reason, a written request for approval of such absence should
be signed by the principal and filed in the superintendent's office at least two (2)
days prior to the first day of anticipated absence.

(Id.).
The School Board and the PEA negotiated off of the PEA'S Professional Leave proposal,
eventually agreeing to a Professional Leave provision which was included in the 2003-2004 and

2004-2005 school year Master Agreement and which has remained uncl~angedas Article X:
paragraph 10.5 in the Master Agreeinent for the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 school years. (Id:,77

3-6, Exs. A-D). That provision provides as follows:
ProfessionaI Leave
Attendance at educational meetings or visiting other schools is permitted at full
pay if such absence is approved by the Principal. If any certificated personnel
wishes to be absent from duty for a brief period to attend a professional meeting,
to visit schools, or otherwise pursue professional developmei~t,a written request
for approval of such absence should be signed by the Principal and filed in the
Superintendent's office at least two (2) days prior to the first day of anticipated
absence. Professional leave is not to exceed two (2) days per year and is noncumulative. The Principal may make exceptions on the number of days allowed
when necessary.

(Id., 77 5-6, Exs. C and D).
The PEA-School Board Master Agreement has at all times contained provisions
concerning salary, as well as a Salary Schedule. (Id., $7 5-6, Exs. C and D). Thus, from the

2003-2004 and 2004-2005 school year Master Agreement to the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008
school year Master Agreement, Article XV, Salary, paragraph 15.1, has provided as follows:
----'

.
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1.

The Board and the Association shall establish a salary schedule for the
several professional positions in the school district that will:

C.

Stimblate professional growth while in service.

* * *
7.

Advance~nenton the Salary Schedule by New Eiployees. Only those
credits earned after the date of certification or award of a Bachelor Degree
in Education will be acceptable for salary advancement.

8.

The salary schedule shall be in effect as set forth in Appendix A.

(Potter Aff., 77 5-6, Exs. C and D).
The Salary Schedule agreed to by the School Board and PEA for the relevant school
i
i

I

1

years compensates School District teachers and other certificated professionals on fhe basis of
their years of experience and (2) their post-Bachelor degrees, including Master's and doctorate,
and post-Bachelor's credits. (Id.).
The PEA-School Board Master Agreement for the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 school
years also contain a non-binding grievance procedures for resolving disputes concerning the
misinterpretation or misapplication of any provision of the Master Agreement. (Id.,7 6, EX.D).
In late-April, 2007, Richards requested professional leave for and, on May 3, 2007, did,
in fact, travel to Coeur d'Alene to defend his final project for his Master's Degree in Education
from the U~liversityof Idaho. (Richards Aff., 77 2 and 3). The School District allowed Richards
to take the leave, but classified the leave as a personal leave day, rather than a professional leave
day. (Id., 1 3, Exs. B and C). During the 2006-2007 school year, Richards requested a total of
two (2) professional leave days for absences that he believed qualified for professional leave
purposes, one of which was to defend his Master's firla1 project. (Id.,

7 4).

And, although

Richards was absent from school or his classroom during that same school year on other
occasions and for other reasons such as illness, bereavement or attendance at music events with

his students (for rehearsals, Chrishnas programs or music programs outside of Potlatch), illose
abse~iceswere either covered by sick, personal or bereavement leave provisions or involved the
perfo~manceof Richards' job duties, including supervising students. (Richards Aff.,

7 4).

On or about June 8, 2007, the PEA and Richards filed a grievance with the School
District, requesting that the School District reclassify Richards' May 3, 2007 leave day as
professional, rather than personal, leave. (Potter Aff., 'l[ 7, Ex. E). The School District denied
the PEA and Richards' grievance both at the initial step and each subsequent step of the
grievance process. (Id., q/qj 7-11, Exs. E through I). The School District's sole reason for
denying Richards professional leave and/or refusing to reclassify the personal leave to
professional leave was that Richards' defense of his Master's final project did not constitute
professioual leave under the tenns of the Master Agreement. (Id., 7 1, Ex. E, and 7 9 , Ex. 2 and

7 1I, Ex. I; Amdavit of John E. Rumel in Support of Plail~tiffs'Motion for Summary Judgrne~lt,
f 2, Ex. A). In reaching its collclusion, the School Board rejected

-- and, indeed, did not even

address -- the PEA'S argument that, because Richards' leave to defend his Master's final project
furthered his professiolzal development and would be beneficial to the School District, the Board
should reclassify Richards' leave from personal leave to professional leave under the Master
Agreement. (Id.,77 10 and I I, Exs. B and I).
On October 11, 2007, the PEA u ~ Richards,
d
through their representatives, informed the
School District that the PEA and Richards intended to pursue litigation coricevning the grievance,
but would forego doing so if the School District agreed to resolve the matter through binding
arbitration. ( I d

2 ) By letter, dated October 12, 2007, the School District declined the PEA

and Richards' invitation to resolve the matter through an alternative dispute resolution
mechanism. (Id., 7 12, Ex. J).
This lawsuit ensued.

--

- -----.
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111. ARGUMENT
A.

Under the Standard for Evaiuatiug Motions for Summary Judgment, the PEA and
Richards' Motion for Summary Judgment Should be Granted.
The s m n a r y judgment standard is well-hiliar to this Court: ' ' [ s l m ~ a r yjudgment

ust be entered when the 'pleadings, depositions, and the admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."' Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), quoted in

Friel v. Boise City Housing Aulhovigi, 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994).

If

reasoliable people could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting inference fioni the
evidence, then the motion should be denied. Kalange v. Rencher, 136 Idaho 192, 195, 30 P.3d
970, 973 (2001). If, however, the record presents no genuine issue of material fact, the nioving

I
I

party's motion must be granted. Cates v. Albertson's, Inc., 226 Idaho 1030, 1033, 895 P.2d
4

1223, 1226 (1995). Specifically, where the facts are not in dispute, the questioll of whether a

I

defendant breached a contract by failing to perfonn is a question of law which should be
resolved by t l ~ ecourt. Austin v. Brown Brothers Co., 30 Idaho 267, 173-174, 164 P. 95, 97
(1917); see also Figuevoa v. Kit-Sun Co., 123 Idaho 149, 158, 845 P.2d 567, 576 (Ct. App.

In addition, "where the evidentiary facts are undisputed and the trial court rather than a
jury will be the trier of fact, sumnary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of
conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict
between those inferences." Jenln'ns v. Barsalou, 145 Idaho 202,205, 177 P.3d 949, 952 (2008);

Greenough v. Farm Bureau Nut. Ins. Co. ofIdaho, 142 Idaho 489, 592, 130 P.3d 1127, 1130
I

(2006); Favnev v. Idaho Falls School Disl. No. 91, 135 Iddlo 333,340, 17 P.3d 281, 284 (2000)
Thus, where the Court will be the trier of fact, it "is entitled to arrive at the most probable
inferences based upon the undisputed evidence properly before it aild grant sunnnary judgment,
--

- -----..
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despite the possibility of conflicting inferences," JR. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Ida110 611,615,
167 P.3d 748, 752 (2006); Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 640, 991 P.2d 362, 365 (1999), or,
in other words, when the court would sit without a jury, the court may draw the inferences it
would be allowed to draw fiom the evidence at trial. Drew v. Souensen, 133 Idaho 534, 537,989
P.2d 276,279 (1999); WzZZc'ams v. Computer Resources, Inc., 123 Idaho 671, 673, 851 P.2d 967,
969 (1993). Under these circumstances and applying these principles, the Idaho Supreme Court
has affrvmed a trial court's decision at summary judgment concerning the interpretation of a

JR. Simplot Co., I44 Idaho at 615-616, 167 P.3d at 752-73; see also
contract ge~~erally,
Favnsworth v. Dairymerz's Creamery Association, 125 Idaho 866, 868-871, 876 P.2d 148, 150153 (Ct. App. 1994), and, specifically, concemilzg teacher employment contracts, including a
collective bargaining agreement entered into between a schooI district and a local education
association. Favner, 135 Idaho at 340-341, 171 P.3d at 284-285.'
Under the standards set fort11 above, and as discussed more fully below, the PEA and
Richards are entitled to judgme~ztas a matter of law on their breach of contract claims in their
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief.

B.

The PEA and Richards are Entitled to Summary Judgment on their First Claim for
Relief for Breach of the Master Agreement.

1.

Under well-settled rules of contract interpretation, Richards was entitled to
use a professional leave day, an& should not have been forced to use a
personal leave day, to travel to and defend his final project for his Master's
Degree in Education.

The Professional Leave provision agreed to by the PEA and the School District in their
first Master Agreement and agreed to without change for their Master Agreement for the 20062007 and 2007-2008 school years was quoted above and bean repeating here:

'

Co~rte~nporaneous
with the filing of their motion for sumnary judgment, tlxe PEA and Richards have filed a motion
to strike the School District's demand for .hial by jury. Because the relief sought by the PEA is entirely equitable
nature, the PEA'S motioil to strike is well taken. As such, the Court (not a jury) will be the tiier of fact in this case.

- --

---
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ProfessionaI Leave

'

Attendance at educational meetings or visiting other schools is permitted at full
pay if such absence is approved by' the Principal. If any certificated personnel
wishes to be absent from duty for a brief period to attend a professional meeting,
to visit schools, or othenvise pursue professional developmel~t,a written request
for approval of such absence should be signed by the Principal and filed in the
Superintendent's office at least two (2) days prior to the first day of anticipated
absence. Professional leave is not to exceed 'two (2) days per y e a and is noncumulative. The Principal may make exceptions on the number of days allowed
when necessary.

.

As this Court is well aware, the primary responsibility of a court in determining the
requirements of contracts is to ascertain the contracting p a ~ i e s 'intent. Stvaub v. Smith, 145
Idaho 65, 69, 175 P.3d 754,758 (2007); Boel v. Stewart Title Guaranp Co., 137 Idaho 9, 13,43
P.3d 768, 772 (2002). Where the ternzs of the contract are clear and unambiguous, the cou~t
should determine their meaning and legal effect from the words of the document viewed as a
wl~ole. Clear Lake Tvout Co., Irzc. v. Clear Springs Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 117, 120, 106 P.3d
443, 446 (2005); SE/Z Const., L.L.C. v. Idaho State Urziversity, 140 Idal~o8, 12, 89 P.3d 848,
852 (2004); Opportunip, L.L.C. v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 607, 38 P.3d 1258, 1263 (2002).
Where, however, a contract is ambiguous, "[tlhe detenuination of the parties' intent is to be
determined by looking at the col~tractas a whole, the language used in the document, the
circumstances under wllich it was made, the objective and puvpose of the particular provision,
and any construction placed upon it by the contracting parties as shown by their conduct or
dealings." J.R. Simplol Co., 144 Idaho at 614, 167 P.3d at 751. A contract will only be
ambiguous where there are at least two different reasollable interpretations of a contract term or
the term is nonsensical. Swanson v. Beco Const~ucttorzCo., lizc., 145 Idaho 59, 62, 175 P.3d
748, 751 (2007). Whether a contract term is ambiguous must be determined by giving the words
or phxase used their colnmon or ordinary meaning, Swcinson, 145 Idaho at 63, 175 P.3d at 752,
ambiguity does not arise merely because a term is not defined in the contract in which it is used,

Shawver v. tIuclcleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 363-364,694-695 (2004), and a number of
courts have relied on dictionary defiliitions of contract terms lo determine their meaning. See,

e g., Swansorz, 145 Idaho at 62, 175 P.3d at 751; National Union Five Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, P.A.

v. Dzxon, 141 Idaho 537, 540, 112 P.2d 825,828 (2005).
The Idaho Supreme Court has also articulated two (2) principles of consh-uction that are
highly relevant to this case: (1) "where nothing in the context indicates otherwise, words used in

,

one sense in one part of the contract are deemed to have been used in the same sense in another
part ofthe sane instrument," Bair v. Barvon, 97 Idaho 26, 30, 539 P.2d 578, 582 (1975); and (2)
in determining the meaning of an ambiguous contractual provision, '"[t]he rule is clear, that a
contract should be construed most strongly against the party preparing it or employing the words
concerning which doubt arises'. . . and that 'where is doubtful language in the contract, it will be
interpreted most strongly against the party who provided that language."' JR. Simplot Co., 144
Idaho at 616, 176 P.3d at 753, quoting Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v Grasmick, 91 Idaho 6, 9, 415
P.2d 48, 51 (1966) and Wervy v. Plzill&s Petroleum Co., 97 Idaho 130, 136, 540 P.2d 792, 798

And, the Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that the foregoing principles apply to
collective bargaining agreements, noting that in determining the meaning and effect of a
collective bargaining agreement, the decisionnlaker should look to "the express provisions of the
coIlective bargaining agreement . . . as well as the parties' intentions revealed through their
bargaining history, past practices, rights established under agreements, and other sources of
contract cons!xuction." Western Const., Iizc. v. Oregon-Southern Idaho and Wyoming District

Council, etc., 101 Idaho 145, 148,609 P.2d 1136, 1139 (1980).
Richards' defense of his filial project for his Master's Degree in Educatioli from the
University of Idaho clearly constituted pursuit of professio~ial development under the
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unambiguous language of the Professional Leave provisions ill the Master Agreement. In this
regard, "professional development" is a broad term and is nowhere defined or otherwise limited
lo specific professiolial development activities in tile Master Agreement. Moreover, in cornmoll
usage, the word "professional" has been defined to mean "an occupation or vocation requiring
traiili~igin the liberal arts or tile sciences and advanced study in a specialized field," Webster's
I1 New Riverside University Dictionary (1984) at 939, and "develop" means "[tlo realize the
potentialities of' or "[tlo aid in the growth of." Id. at 370. Under these definitions, Richards'
defeiise of his final project for his Master's Degree in Education clearly aided in his growth as a
I

teacher through advanced training. As such, Richards' activities constituted "professional
development" under the Professional Leave provision of the Master Agreement.
A review of the Master Agreement as a whole leads to the same conclusion. In addition

I

to using the term "professional development" ill the Professional Leave provision, the Master
Agreement uses the term "professional growth" in its Salary provisions. In that latter provision,
the Master Agreement provides that the Salary Schedule appended to the Master Agreement
"will . . . [s]lirnulate professional growth while in service," (Potter Aff., Ti/ 5-6, Exs. C and D)
and W e r establishes a Salary Schedule which keys increases in compensation for School
Dishict professional employees to their heaving earned advanced degrees, including Master's
degrees, and obtaining post-Bachelor degree academic credit. (Id). Thus, given that the PEA
and School Board are presumed to ascribe the same meaning to similar terms used throughout
the Master Agreement, and given that the tenn "professional growth" is used in the Salary
Schedule provisions to mean the acquisition of post-Bachelor degrees, including Master's
Degrees and doctorates, the term "professional development," when used in the Professional
Leave provisions of the Master Agreement, cleady encolnpasses Richards' defense of his
Master's Degree final project as the last step toward earning an advanced degree. For a11 of
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these reasons, the Professional Leave provisions of the Master Agreement u~ambiguously
required tlie School District to approve Richards' request to use a professional leave day on May

3, 2007 to travel to Coeur d'Alene to defend his final project.
Moreover, even if the Professional Leave provision is ambiguous (and it is not), the result
would be no different. h this regard, requiring the School District to grant Richards professional
leave under these circunstances would iirrther the purposes of both the Professional Leave and
salary provisions of the Master Agreement, i.e., to (1) encourage professional developmelit of
teachers through colitinued education by reinoving barriers, such as loss of personal ~eavkdays
or loss of compensation, when mderteing such activities, and (2) provide illcentives for
professional growth by rewarding teachers with increased compensation for post-Bachelor's
degree acquisition. Also, the PEA and School Board's bargaining history reveals that the School
Board proposed the language of the version of the Professional Leave provisions that ultimately
ended up in the Master Agreement. In so doing, and by obtaining the PEA'S agreement to allow
professional leave for certificated personnel who "otherwise pursue professioiial developmelit,"
the School Board avoided the PEA'S proposed broader language, which would have allowed use
of professional leave for "any personal reason which is not an unavoidable emergency . . .."
. ..

Under these circunstances, the Court iliust coilstrue the Professional Leave language strongly
against the School District, i.e.,the pasty who provided the language in the first instance.'
For all of these reasons, Richards' use of a professional leave day to travel to the
U~iiversityof Idaho -- Coeur d'A1ene Center to defend his Master's Degree final project fell we11
within the meaning o f t h e term "professional developinent" under the Professional Leave

Under Idaho statutory law, the state allocation matrix grants school districts additional funding for teachers who
obtain advanced degrees. See Idallo Code $ 33-1004A. Tl~us,Richards' obtaini~~g
his Master's Degree inured to not
only his and lGs students'educational benefit, but to the financial beneM of the School District as well.

provisions octhe Master Agreement. This Court should so hold.3
The SEhool District breached the Master Agreement by failing to allow
Richards to use a professional day to defend his final project for his Master's
Degree.

2.

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a breach of colltract occurs where a party,
without legal excuse, fails to perform a promise that malces up the whole or part of a contract.

Independence Lead Mines v, Hecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22, 28, 137 P.3d 409, 415 (2006);
Fox v. Mountain West Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 710, 52P.3d 848, 855 (2002).
As discussed above, Richards was entitled to use a Professional Leave day to travel to
and defend his fi11a1 project for his Master's Degree in Education mder the teuns of the Master
Agreen~eiit. Moreover, it is undisputed that the Scl~oolDistrict and School Board refused to
allow Richards to do so. Accordingly, the PEA and Richards are entitled to summary judgment
on their First Claim for Relief ibr breach of the PEA-School Board Master Agreement.
C.

Richards is Entitled to Summary Judgment on his Second Claim for Relief for
Breach of his Individual Employment Contract.
Richards' employment contract with tile School District for the 2006-2007 school year

provided in pertinent part as follows:
T l ~ eterms of this Contract shall be subject to ameiid~nentand adjnsbnent
to confolm to applicable terms of the Negotiated Master Colitract
subsequently executed by the Board of Trustees and the Representative
Organization for the ensuing year.

8.

(Richards Aff.,

1 1, Ex. A).

The Idaho Supreme Court has likewise held that colIective

bargaining agreements entered into between local education associations and school boards
niodify and become part of teachers' individual employlnent contracts. Farner, 135 Idaho at
"Iris conclusion coznporis with the recognition or assuinption by numerous courts and educational institutions tkat
post-graduate study and scholarly activities, as well as obtaining advanced degrees contributes to the professional
development or growth of teachers and other professional educators. See, e.g., Ohio Unive~siiyof Olzio CivilRighds
Commission, 2008 W.L. 625565, *G (Ohio App. 2008), Hancoclcex ?el. Hancock v. D~iscoll,2004 W.L. 877984, *7
(Mass. Super. 2004); Tippecanoe Ed Ass 'n v. Board of School Trustees of Tippecanoe School Corp., 429 N.E.2d
967,968 (Iild. App. 1982); Weightnzan v. C I R . , 1982 W.L. 10967 (1982).
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341, 17 P.2d at 285; Buhl Ed. Ass'n v. Joint SchoolDist. No. 412, 101 Idaho l6,22-23, 607 P.2d

As discussed above, the School District and School Board breached the Professional
Leave provision of the Master Agreement by refusing to allow Richards to use a professional
leave day lo defend his final project for his Master's Degree. Because the Master Agreement
modified and became part of Richards' individual employment contract with the School Disti-ict,
the Sctiool District and School Board's breach of the Master Agreement constituted a breach of
Richards' individual employment contract as well.
D.

The PEA and Richards are Entitled to the Declaratory and Equitable Relief Solrght
in the Prayer for Relief in their Con~plaint.

1.

The PEA and Richards are entitled to declaratory relief.

Idaho Code 5 10-1201 authorizes district courts to issue declaratory judgments, providing
as follows:
Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have
power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or
not f~n-therrelief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding
shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory
judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either
affirmative or negative in form and effect, and such declarations
shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.
Specifically, Sections 10-1202 and 10-1203 provide for a declaratory judgment
coilcerning a person's rights or obligations under a contract, providing ill pertinent part as
follows:

Any person interested under a . . . written contract . . . or whose
rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a . . .contract
may have determined any question of constr~ctionor validity
arising under the . . . contract . . . and obtain a declaration of rights,
status or other legal relations thereunder.

A contract may be construed either before or after there has been a
breach thereof.
Idaho appellate courts have made clear that the foregoing statutes authorize the entry of
aratory judgment to settle disputes regarding the rights and status of perso~saffected by
ts. Utah Power- & Light Co. v. Idaho Public Utilities Com'n., 112 Idaho 10, 12, 730
P.2d 930,932 (1986); Student Loan Fund ofldaho, Jnc. v. Payette County, 125 Idaho 824, 825,

,

875 P 2d 236,237 (Ct. App. 1994).
Applying the above-discussed statutory autllority, the PEA and Richards are entitled to
declaratory orders stating that the School District breached the Master Agreement and
Richards' individual employ~lentcontract by refusing Richards' request to use a professio~lal
leave day to defend his Master's final project and declaring Richaxds' right to equitable relief.
2.

The PEA and Richards are Entitled to Equitable Relief.

Courts of equity will enforce contracts, absent a coinpelli~lgreason to do otherwise.

Williams v. Continental L f e & Accident Co., 100 Idaho 71, 74, 593 P.2d 708, 711 (1979);
Quayle v. Maclcert, 92 Idaho 563, 569-570, 447 P.2d 679, 685-686 (1968). Tlius, the Idaho
Supreme Court has stated that, "[wlllere a court of equity is asked to enforce a cove~laultby
ordering specific performance and granting an injunction to prevent a breach of it, equitable
principles will prevail and the rules of fair dealing and good conscience must be applied."

Smith v. Shinn, 82 Idaho 141, 148, 350 P.2d 348, 351 (1960), quoted in Dvong V . Coulthard, 87
Idaho 486,496,394 P.2d 283,289 (1964).
As alluded to above, the PEA and Richards are entitled to equitable relief ordering the

School District to reclassify the personal leave day granted to Richards to defend his Master's
final project as a professional leave day and ordering the School District to restore a personal
leave day to Richards' account

-- .
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IV. CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons stated above, the PEA and Richards are (I) entitled to a
determination as a matter of law that the School District breached the PEA-School Board Master
Agreement and Richards' individual employment contract by refusing to allow Richards to use a
professional leave day to travel to and defend his final project for his Master's Degree in
Education at the Uiiiversity of Idaho and (2) entitled to declaratory and equitable orders
requiring the School District to treat Richards' absence from school for that purpose as
professio~lalleave, rather than persolla1 leave.
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DATED this -- day of May, 2008.
1;DAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION

Attorney for Plaintiff Potlatch Education
Association and Doug Richards

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the
copy of the foregoing to be served via:

Hand Delivered
to:

Brian I<. Julian, Esq.
Davis VanderVeide, Esq.
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fiffh Sheet, Suite 700
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Facsimile: 344-5510

Tkyof May, 2008, I caused a true and correct

John E.Rume1, Esq.
I D ~ EI~UCATION
O
ASSOCLATION
620 North Sixth Street
P.O. Box 2638
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 333-8560
Facsimile: (208) 344-1606

2008 RAY 1 2 At4 18: 42
CLERK OF DiSTRICT CVJf??'

James M. Piotrowslti, E s ~ .
713 West Franklin Stxeet
p.0. Box 2864
Boise, Idaho 83701-2864
Telephone: (208) 331-9200
Facsimile: (208) 33 1-9201

Attorneys for Plaintzffs

W THE DISTRICT COURr OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COIJNTY OF L A T m

POTLATCH EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS,

)

1

plaintiff,

POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285, aid BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRlCT NO.

Case No. CV2007-1151

)1
/

AFFIDAVIT OF DOUG RICHARDS
INSUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY

)

JUDGMENT

)

V.

1
1

1

Defendants.
STATE OF I D m O

1
1

) ss.

County of Kootenai
I, DOUG R I C H W S , having been duly sworn, depose and say as follows:
1.

1 am employed as a teacher in Defendant Potlatch School Dist~ctN O 285

(''School District") aid have held that position from the 1992-1993 school year to the present.
Attached as Exlribit "A" and incorporated by this reference is a true and correct copy of my
Teachers' Standnrd Contract with the School District for the 2006-2007
2.

In late-April, 2007, I made a request in writing to my building

permission to use a professional leave day to travel to and defend my final p
Master's Degree in Education from the University of Idaho -- Coeur d'Ale11e Center
3.

On May 3, 2007, I did, in fact, travel &om Potlatch to Coeur d'Alene and

defended my final project for my Master's Degree. The School District, however, rather than
granting my request for professional leave, infonned me that I would have to take a persolla1
leave day in order to defend my final project. True and correct copies of a Certified Employee
Absence Report and the School District's response to my request for professional leave are
attached to this Affidavit as Exhibits "B" and "C," respectively, and incorporated by this
reference.
4.

During the 2006-2007 school year, I requested use of two (2) professional leave

days for absences' that I believed qualified for professional leave purposes, one of which was to
defend my Ella1 Master's project at the University of Idaho - Coeur d'Alene Center on May 3,
2007. Although I was absent from school or my classroom during the 2006-2007 school year for
other reasons, such as illness, bereavement or attending music events with my students
(rehearsals, Christmas programs or music prograins outside of Potlatch), those absences were
either covered by siclc leave, personal leave or bereavement leave or involved performing my job
duties, including supervising students.
4.

A

I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth in this Affidavit and, if called
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as a witness, could and would competently and truthfully testify to such matters.

EXECUTED This

q23day of May, 2008, in the city of Cceur d'Alene, County of

SUBSCRBED AND SWORN To before me this

4day of May, 2008.
3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY Thai on the *aY
copy of the foregoing to be served via:

Hard Deiivered
to:
Amy Wl~ite,Esq.
Andersou, Julian & Hull, LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
FacsiiniIe: 344-55 20

of May, 2008, L caused a true and correct
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RiIS COVfRACr, made this ist day of June yoar of 2006, by and between Potlatch schaol D i s h i d No. 285,
Potlatch, Idaho ("the Distrlci"J and

D o ~ g l a J.
s Rfchards ("the Teacher").

VGnNESSETH:

1. The District nereby employs the Teacher pursuant to Idaho Code 3 33-515 for the duration of the 2006-2007 scilool
year, consisting of a period of 290 days, and agrees to pay the TeacR~ii.for said services a sum of FORV-MINE
Potiars ($

THOUSAND SIX HUUDREL) FIFTY-FOUR-

49.654

) of which 1 / 1 2 shall be payable on the last day

of tI,s months September year of 2006 to August year of 2007 lncluslve, and such other monetary benefits as
accorded tolls celtiflcated employees by the Dlstrid.

-

Base Sslaty
Placement on the salary schedule: Education

2. ?'eatiiingasslgnment(s):

,

$

49.654

Experience ^15__

-,

EIe~nenta~~SecondawM~sic~T~cher'

and such other duties as may be assigned by the District for whlcli the Teacher Is properly certified and endorsed.
3. TheTeacher agrees to petfom all te-aclling assignments rnade by the District in accordance wlth the highest profe~~lonal

star?dards2nd to lhave and malntaln the legal qualifications required to teach In tile afarsold grades or subjects during ali
tlrnes that performance is required hereunder,
4, I? Is understood and agrqed between the parties that this Contract is subyect to the applicable laws ofthe State

of Idaho,

the duly adopted rules of the State Board of Education and the Policies of the District which are, by reference,
Incorporated herein and made a part of this agreement the same as if fu!!~set forth herein.
5. Any material False statement knowingly rnade in the writ:;"
appi1ca:ion for a position wlth the District shali constitute
sufficient ground for volding this Contract.

6. Any person signing a contract for a fourth consecutivF full school yew shall be piaced'on a renewable contract status
pursuant to Section 33-515, Idaho Code.
7. It is mut~allyunderstood and agreed by and between the parties that nothing herein contained shall operate or be

construed as a waiver of any of the rlglits, powers, privileges, or duties of either party hereto, by and under the laws of

the Stare of Idaho, except as expressly stated in this Contract.

6 . The terms of this Contract shall be subject to amendment and adjustment to conform to applicable terms of the
Negotiated Master Contmct subsequently executed by the Board of Trustees and the Reereseniative Organization for the
ensutng year.
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John E. Rumel, Esq.
IDAT30 EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
620 North Sixth Street
P.O. Box 2638
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 333-8560
Facsimile: (208) 344-1606

CLEHK OF DiSmiCT Ci)!j;ij
LZ4T,4)<C;QUf,,jjJ'

James M. Piotrowski, Esq.
Marty Durand, Esq.
KERZFELD & PIOTROWSIU, LLP
713 West Franklin Street
P.O. Box 2864
Boise, Idaho 83701-2864
Telephone: (208) 331-9200
Facsinlile: (208) 33 1-9201
Attorneys for PlaintifSs

I
NTHE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDrUIO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAK
POTLATCEI EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHI\RDS,

1
)

Case No. CV2007-1151

I

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN E. RUMEL
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.
POTLATCEI SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.

1
1

285,

)

285, andBOARD OF TRUSTEES,

1
Defendants.

STATE OF lDAKO

1
) ss.

County of Ada

I, JOHN E. RUMEL, having been duly sworn, depose and say as follows:
1.

I am an attorney licensed to practiced law in the State of Idaho and represent
a

UOOG~~4

AFFTDAVIT OF JOWN E. RUMEL W SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY .IUDGMENT - 1

Plaintiffs Potlatch.Education Association ("PEA") and Doug Richards in the above-encaptioned
action.
2.

Attached as Exhibit "A" and iilcorporated by this reference is a true and correct

copy of excerpts

s' Response to Plaintiffs'

Documents, Request

s for Production of
EA and Richards by

Defendants Potlatch School District No. 285 and Board of Trustees,

District No'

285 (collectively, "School District$ on April 18, 2008.
3

1 have pnsonal lmowledge of the matters set forth in this Affidavit and, if called

as a witness, could and would competently and tmthfully testify to such matters.
EXECUTED This p d a y of May, 2008, in the City of Boise, County of Ada, State of
Idaho
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CERTXFlLCATE OF SERVICE

1HEREBY CERTIFY That on the m a y of May, 2008,I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to be served via:
U.S. Mail
Facsimile Transinission
Hand Delivered
to:
Brian K. Juiian, Esq.
Davis VanderVelde, Esq.
Anderson, Julian & Ilull, LLP
C. W. Moorc Plaza
250 South FiBli Street, Suite 700
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Facsimile: 344-55 10

John E. Rumel

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN E. RUMEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENX - Q qj
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Brian K. Julian - ISB No. 2 3 6 0
Amy G . White - ISB No. 5 0 1 9
Mark D. Sebastian - ISB No. 601 2
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
W. Moore Plaza
0 South Fifth Street, Suite 7 0 0
s t Office Box 7 4 2 6
Boise, Idaho 8 3 7 0 7 - 7 4 2 6
Telephone: ( 2 0 8 ) 344-5800
Facsimile:
( 2 0 8 ) 344-551 0
all: m a j h l a w . c o m
awhite@ajhlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

Plaintiffis),
vs.
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 285,
and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POTLATCH
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 285,

DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS,
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION, AND
INTERROGATORIES.

Defendant(s1.

COMES NOW Defendant, by and through its counsel of record, Anderson Julian

& Hull, LLP and hereby answers and responds to Plaintiffs' First lnterrogatones and
Requests for Production as follows:

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY -1

Defendants deny the remaining allegations of said request.

leave day as professional leave.
RESPORSE:

The time was denied as professional leave because the basis

for the request did not constitute professional leave as envisioned b y the Master
Agreement. Defendant reserves the right t o supplement.
lNTERROGATORY NO. 2:

A s t o any and all of the above requests for

admissions thar you did n o t respond t o w i t h an unequivocal admission, please state
all fact upon which you based your response.

. ,

RESPONSE: Please see responses t o Requests for Admissions.
ilVTERROGATORY 1\10. 3: Please state all facts upon which y o u base your
denial of paragraph 5 of the PEA'S and Richard Complaint.
RESPONSE: Within the Complaint the Plaintiff has characterized the request
as one for professional leave. The leave requested should n o t becharacterized as
professional leave, but instead should be characterized as personal leave.
INTERROGATORY 1\10. 4: Please state all facts upon which you base your
Denial of the PEA'S and Richard's allegation in paragraph 6 o f their Complaint that
"[tlhe School District denied the PEA and Richards' grievance, b o t h a t the initial
level and each subsequent step of the grievance process."
RESPONSE:

As written the subject paragraph appears t o allege that M r .

Richards was denied filing of a grievance w h e n in fact it was the request made

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY -5

pocket c o s t s t o Mr. Richards. Defendant reserves t h e right to supplement.
DATED this

?

5'

& day of April, 2008.
ANDERSON JULIAN & H U L

ttorneys for Defendant

I

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY -7

April 18,2008
Pa.ge 8
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

&

I hereby certify that on this
day of April, 2008, 1 served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION by delivering the same to
each of the following attorneys of record, by method indicated below, addressed as
follows:

i

'John Rumel
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOC.
620 n. 6THStreet
P.O. BOX2638
Boise, ID 83701

James M. Piotrowski
Marty Durand
HERZFELD & PIOTROWSKI, LLP
713 W. Franklin St
P.O. Box 2864
Boise, ID 83701-2864

&
<

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

&'

11
[ ]
[ ]

U S . Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (: (208) 344-1606

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (: (208) 331-9201

5
7
/>,"/
______I---

-..

Brian K. Julian

I

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY -8

John E. Rumel, Esq.
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCLATION
620 North Sixth Street
P.O. Box 2638
Boise, ID 83701
Telepllone: (208) 333-8560
Facsimile: (208) 344-1606
Marty Durand, Esq.
HERZFELD & PIOTROWSKI, LLP
713 West Franklin Street
P.O. Box 2864
Boise, Idaho 83701-2864
Telephone: (208) 331-9200
Facsimile: (208) 331-9201
Attorneys for PlaintifSs
TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDLDhIIO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

POTLATCH EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS,

1
1

Plaintiff,
-

v.
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285,

)
)
)

1

Case No. CV2007-1151
AFFIDAV-IT OF BRIAN POTTER
IN SUPPORT OF PLATNTIFFS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

1
1

Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO

1

)

1
) ss.

County of Latah

1

I, BRIAN POTTER, having been duly sworn, depose and say as follows:
1.

From the 1992-1993 school year to the present, I have been employed as a teacher

AFFIDAVIT OF BRIAN POTTER IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDG

in Defendant Potlatch School ~ i s t r i cNo.
t 285 ("Scl~oolDistrict").
2.

From approximately June 2003 to the present, I have served on Plaintiff Potlatch

Education Association's ("PEA") bargaining teain in its negotiations over collective bargaining
agreements (denominated "Master Agreements") with Defendant Board of Trustees, Potlatch
Scl~oolDistrict No. 285 ("School Board").
3.

Attached as Exhibit "A" and incorporated by this reference is a true and correct

copy of a side-by-side cornparisoil of the School Board's atid the PEA'S respective proposals
concerning Professioiial Leave (with the School Board's proposals in the left column and the
PEA'S proposals in the right column) exchanged by the parties during negotiations over a Master
Agreement for the 2003-2004 school year.
4.

Attached as Exhibit "B" and incorporated by this reference is a true and correct

copy of the parties' tentative agreement on Professional Leave language for the Master
Agreement, which tentative agreetneiit was reached by the School District and the PEA

011

August 18,2004.
5.

Attached as Exhibit "C" and incorporated by this reference are true and correct

copies of excerpts froin the School Board-PEA Master Agreement for the 2003-2004 and 20042005 school years, which Master Agreement contains the Professional Leave language agreed to

by the parties in Exhibit "B" above.

6.

Attached as Exhibit "D" and incorporated by this reference are true and co~rect

copies of excerpts from the School Board-PEA Master Agreement for the 2006-2007 and 20072008 school years, which Master Agreement contains the same Professional Leave and Salary
provisions (except for the salary amounts themselves) that were agreed to by the PEA and the
School Board in their first Master Agreement for the 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 school years.

AFFICAVIT OF BRZAN POTTER IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMEW - 2

,.

,

ciooosa

7.

Attached as Exhibit "E"and incorporated by this reference is a true and correct

copy of Doug Richards and the Potlatch Education Association's ("PEA") Grievance Report
Form and the School District's Level 1 decision on Richards and the PEA's grievance, both of
which are dated Ju2e 8,2007.
8.

Attached as Exhibit "F" and incorporated by this reference is a true and correct

copy of a docur~lentfiled by the PEA, dated June 16,2007, and showing receipt by the School
District

011

June 18, 2007, moving Richards and the PEA'S grievance to the next step of the

grievance process.
9.

Attached as Exhibit "G" and incorporated by this reference is a hue and correct

copy of a memo from School District Superintelldent Joseph Kren to the PEA, dated June 19,
2007, denying Richards and the PEA's grievance at the next step.
10.

Attached as Exhibit "H"and incorporated by this reference is a true and correct

copy of a letter that the PEA presented to the School Board at its June 20, 2007 meeting
concerning the PEA and Richards' grievance.

I I.

Attached as Exhibit

"I" and incorporated by (his reference is a hue and correct

copy of a letter, dated June 27, 2007, that I received lorn Heidi

I,.Davis, Chairperson of the

School Board, concerning the PEA and Richards' grievance.
12.

On October 11, 2007, Idaho Education Association Region Director Patti Roberts

and I inet with Superintendent Kren concen~ingthe possibility of arbitrating the PEA and
Richards' grievance. Attached as Exhibit '7" and incorporated by this reference is a true and
correct copy of a letter, dated October 12,2007, that I received from Chailyerson Davis.
13.

1have also been involved in the PEA's bargaining with the School Board over the

terms of the Master Agreement for the 2008-2009 school year. Attached as Exhibit "K" and

AFFIDAVIT OF BRLAN POTTER I
NSUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
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incorporated by this refcrmocc is a

me and

PAGE
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correct copy of the School. Board's proposal

ooncnning professional lmve language, which proposal was provided by the Sohool Board to the

PEA on or about Jahuary 14,2008.
14.

X have personal knowledge of the matters set foah in tbis -davit

and, if called

as a witness, could and would competently and t~~tbfully
testify to such matters.
EXECUTED %s

7

-day of May, 2008, in thc town of PotIatob, County o f k t & ,

State of ldabo.

SUESCiUBED AND SWORN To before me lhis

dday wFMay, 2008.
1-

-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1 REREBY CERTFY That on the *8ay
copy of the foregoing to be served via:

of May, 2008, 1 caused a true and correct

U.S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission

%

Hand Delivered

to:

Amy White, Esq.
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP
C. W, Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Facsimile: 344-55 10
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ARTICLE 1
RECOGNITION

PEA Proposed Negotiations Agreement 1-3104

.-

Parties and Purpose. This
Agreement is b e h e e n the Board of Tiustees
of Potlatch Schooi District285 located in
Potlatch, Idaho and in L a t h County
(hereinafter "Board") and the Potlatch
Education Association (hereinafter
"Association") to estab!ish procedures for
bargaining and the specific items to be
bargained between the parties pursuant to
the provisions of Idaho Law.
1.1

ARTICLE I
RECOGNITICFI
1.1

1.2
Recognition. The Board
recognizes the Association as the sole and
exclusive negotiating agent for the p7qoses
of negotiations with certificated Professional
Employees of the District so long as the Association has the approval oftbe major;,ty . . . . . ..
of the professional employees of the Distiici
to so represent them.
1.2

,

'

-

'

The Board of Trustees of School District
285, Latah County, Potlatch, Idaho,
hereinafter referred lo as the Board,
recognizes Potlatch Education
Association as the sole and exclusive
negotiating agentfor all employed
certificated personnel (except
Superintendent and Principals),
hereinafier referred to and defined as
professional employees.
Neootiation Exciusivih'
..
The Board agrees not to negoiiste with .
any other employees' organization, .. .

. . .. . .. . .

1.
Exclusio~s.
.
.
foliotr,<ngcertiiicated employees of the
. .
......
District i r e excluded from representa6on by
... - . the Association:
a.
Superintenclefit ,
b.
Assistat
Superintendent
. . .
c.
Principals
d.
Vice Principals
e.
Directors

Association Recoaniiion

"

Additional Excl~sions
The following employees are excluded from
the appljcation ofthis conkact:
. . . . . . .? . . . . .
a.
Substitutes
.....
. .
.. - .-.... b: - Non-teaching-'Coaches (who may have a teaching
certificate)

individual ~rnpioyee,or group of
employees, whether under contractor on
leave, with regard to terms and
conditions of employment unless
otherwise provided for in this Agreement
or unless mutually agreed to by ihe
pariies during the tern of this
Agreemgnt.

2.

.
.

. . .

'

:

...

.

.

,a&.,rc"*-,*, ,,.- .&*~-~~.*-*-'"-~:
M c d C o l u ~ ~. s. B. ~. .r ?. E. ..Position
A
2-!24$
. .

-1.

.

.

,

.,.... . .
:

.

.

10 3 Immediate Family Illness/
Funeral Leave. Upon approval of the
Superintendent or designee, certificated
shall be granted ieave of absence
at fuil pay for serious illness in the
immediate family (spouse, children, brother,
. sister, mother and father) or to attend a
funeral for a spouse, child, brother, brotherin-law, sister, sister-in-law, mother, motherin-law, father, or father-in-law not to exceed
three (3) days per year. This leave is noncumulative.

5.3

Certified personnel shall be granted
leave of absence at full pay for serious
illness in the immediate family (spouse,
children, brother, sister, mother and
father) not to exceed three (3)days per
year. This leave is non-cumulative.

5.4

10.4 Personal Leave. 'Upon
.
, ~the
f building principal,
: rd personnel shall be granted leave
:
at full pay for personal business.
not exceed three (3)
:

:; I/ '

Funerals
Ceitified personnel shall be granted
ieave of absence at full pay to attend
funerals, not to exceed three (3) days per
year. This leave is non-cumulative.

.

,

.,.

Immediate Family Illness

5.5

Peisonal Leave

Certified personnel shall be granted leaveof
absence a1 full pay for business that cannot be
conducted when school is not in session. This
. (3)days per
allowance shall not, exceed three
year and is non-cuinulative.';~
..

day or days of
9 , ; .; :save may be grmted (with
.:-:r itive approval) with the stipulation
that the teacher pay for hisher own . .. .
. . ..
..
substitute teacher at the current substitute . .. .... .. .
An additional day or dais of personal leave m i y
rate of pay.
. .
. ..
be granted (with building administrative approval)
with
the stipuiati& that the teacher pay hiskei
10.5 Professional Leave.
.
..
..
own substitute teacher at the cuneni substitu!?
Attendance at educational meetings or rate of pay.
visiting other schools is permitted at N 1pay
...
. ...
if such absence is approqed by the
5.6
Professional Leave
Superintendent. If any teacher wishes to be absent from duty for a brief period to attend .I
Attendance at educational meetings or
a professional meeting or workshop, to visit
visiting other schools is permitted at iull
schools, or otherwise pursue professionaj
pay if-&ch absenaeis-appreved-by the
developmeni, .a -&#en-reqxest-for-appreval . .
principal. li any supervisor, principal,
of such absence should be signed by the
teacher, or other employee wishes to be
principal and filed in the superintendent's
.
absent irom duty for a brief period to
office at least ten (10) working days prior to
attend
a professional meeting, lo visit
the first day of anticipated absence.
schools, or for any personal reason
Professiond leave is not to exceed two (2)
which
is not an'unaqoi'dableemergency,
days per year and is noncumulative.
..
. - . ..
request for approval of such -.
a written ,.-.-,:.,.!,i,.!,
. .~
absence should.besigned by the
principal and filed in the superintendent's
office at least bio (2) days piioi to the
first day of anticipated absence.
:.,,..l.,c,

,

F:

,

,.

,

,

,

,

I

is non-cumulative. The pady requesting tlie leave must provide 24 hours
per year
notice to the building principal.
Employees who extend personal leave beyond the three (3) days will have 1 / 1 9 0 ~
of their cojitkact pa$ deducted from their salary.

I

I

I

1

10.5 ~rofessionalLeave. Attendance at educational meetings or visiting other
S C ~ O O ~isS permia;fa at full pay ifi~suchabsence is apprc~redby the Priccipd. Lf any
certificated per,$o&e1piishes io be absent'from duty for a brief period to attend a
professional meet&, .to visit schools, or otherwise pusue profeseional development, a.
written request foi&pprovalof such absence should-besigned by the Principa1,and 5Ied
in the Superhtendent's
. .
. . office at least two (2) days prior to the first day of atiticipated
absence.' Professional leave is not to exceed two (2) days per year and is noncumulative.
The Principal may make e%~ep.tions
on the n~~inber
of days allowed when necessary.
,

10.6

Jufv JhtydhGlitary Service Leave.

JU&DU'~V.Teachers in the Potlatch School Diiiffct shall be excu.sed for
1.
jury duty,. , I ?While
on jury duiy; an employee is to receive fuli pzy &on1 the school
<;,:,,:.'.',

.

district k u s Zhe amount they receive for services they render on jury duty.
~ n i p l o ~ig&l'L;eep
k~i
reimbursement for mileage.

.

.

.

.

2. .- MIitarV Service:
Employees who are members of the Armed Forces Reserve
A.
shall be granted m i l i t q leaves of absence if called intb
or the ~atiopal'8k~rd(s)
service. Whil6,on
... :> ..,leave,
.
the employee shall retainall beneEts, seniority
. ~~d.incrementaLadIjan~.ement.as..though~empIo-yment.
had.b.e.en.c.~nu~o~s.incbe~~.
. . .. . .
district. uponrr% &om leave, the employee shall be placed in the position last
,.
held or a simil8jWsitiotiin the district.
B. Any bargaining unit member who is member of a branch
.
. . . ..,, . ,:,
of the b e d p- & c,'.8.<2
e s Res'enii or the National Guard(s) sballbe paid the difference
between hi&k&r R C ~ ~ & & / G Upay
U ~ and the regular p@ heishe would receive
from the employer
diring any period when the &ected bqaining unit meniber
.,: .i
:,..:: .
engages in.tra&Upg
. . .
m tlie Reserves or'Natiod @ard(s).

a

, :,;

..

,

,

.. .

10.7' &&i~fidfi Leave. Should the Association send representatives to local,
state or national i:dnfer&neesor on oSber,businesspertinent t o Association affairs, a e s e
representatives 'desi&i&d by the Association shall be excused without loss of salary for
up to three (3) days with aggregate total of eight (8) days of Association leave per year
with all substitute dosts id be provided by the Association, A written notice for leave
shall have beep subrhitted .to the PriilcipaI at least two (2) days prior to the date of the
requested leave. Employees who wish to extend Association Ieave may use personal
ove.
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For 2003-2004 and 2004-2005
Between the

POTLATCH EDUCATION ASSOCIATION

hn affiliate of the
Idaho Education Association
'\

And the
National Education Association

AND THE

BOARD OF TRUSTEES
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRlCT NO. 285

ARTICLE I
RECOGNITION
Pwies and~urpose.This Agreement is between the Board of Trustees of
1.1
t located in Potlatch, Idaho and in Latah County (hereinafter
Potlatch School ~ i s t r i c285
"Board" and the Potlatch Education Association (hereinafter "Association") to establish
procedures for bargaining and the specific items to be bargained between the parties
pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Law.
1.2 . Recognition.. The Board recognizes the Associatioa as'the sole and
exclusive negotiating agent for the purposes of negotiations with certificated Professional
Employees of the District so long as the Association has the approval of the majority of'
"

~

-tbr:.,pr~fkssiand~mplo.~ees..offthee.eDii~t~.ct-t~.Os~-~ePre~ent~~1.hem~1.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

2.
a.
b.

Exclusions. The following cerlifica~edemployees of the District
are excluded from representation by the Association:
Superintendent
Assistant Superintendent
Principals
Vice Principals
Directors
Additional Exclusions The following employees are excluded
fiom the application of this contract:
Substitutes
Non-teaching Coaches (who may have a teaching certificate)

Certification. Should the Board for good cause or 35% of the Professional
1.3
Employees request, the Association will conduct an election by represented Professional
Employees, by secret ballot to determine whether or not the Association has majority
approval to represent the Professional Employees. A Board representative and an
Association representative shall be allowed to observe the balloting unless bolh parties
agree to waive their right. The Board and the Association shall each appoint one
representative to count the ballots and report the election results.

Page 1

10.4 Personal Leave. Upon approval of the building administrator, certificated
personnel shall be granted leave of absence at full pay for business that cannot be
conducted when school is not in session. This allowance shall not exceed three (3) days
per year and is non-cumulative. T l ~ party
e
requesting the leave must provide 24 hours
notice to the building principal.
Employees who extend personal leave beyond the three (3) days will have 11190"'
of their contract pay deducted &om their salary.

.

10.5 Professional Leave. Attendance at educational meetings or visiting other
schools is permitted at full pay if such absence is approved by the Principal. If any
ceriificatedpersonnel~wishes
to be absent from duty for a brief period to attend a
professional meeting, to visit schools, or otherwise pursue professional development, a
written request for approval of such absence should be signed by ihe Principal and filed
in the Superintendent's office at least two (2) days prior to the first day of anticipated
absence. Professional leave is not to exceed two (2) days per year and is nonc&nulative.
The Principal may make exceptions on the number of days allowed when necessary.
10.6

Jury DutyMilitary Service Leave.

Jurq Duty. Teachers in the Potlatch School District shall be excused for
1.
jury duty. While on jury duty, an employee is to receive full pay from t l ~ eschool
diswict minus the amount they receive for services they render on jury duty.
Einployees shall keep reimbursement for mileage.

2.

Military Service:
Employees who are members ofthe h ~ e Forces
d
Reserve
A.
or the National Guard(s) silali be granted military leaves of absence if called into
service. While on leave, the einployee shall retain all benetits, seniority
and incremental advancement as tlzough employment had been continuous in the
district. Up011 return from leave, the employee shall be placed in the position last
held or a similar position in the disirict.
B. Any bargaining unit member who is a member of a branch
of the h e d Forces Reserve or the National Guard(s) shall be paid the difference
between kisiher ReserveIGuasd pay and Che,regularpay heishe would receive
from the employer during any period when the affected bargaining unit member
,
engages in training in the Reserves or National Guard(s).
10.7 Association Leave. Should the Association send representatives to local,
state or national conferences or on other business pertinent to Association affairs, these
representatives designated by the Association shall be excused without loss of saIary for
up to three (3 j days w ? t an aggregate total of eight (8) days of Association leave per year
with all substitute costs to be provided by the Association. A written notice for ieave
shall have been submitted to the Pri~~cipaI
at least two (2) days prior to the date of the
requested leave. Employees who wish to extend Association leave may use personal
leave as stated in Section 10.4 above.
Page 1l
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ARTICLE XV
SALARY
15.1

Salary Schedule.

The Board and the Association shall establish a salary schedule for the several
l.
professional positions in the school district ihat will:
A.

B.
C.

Attract to this school district the best candidates available.
Give stability to the professional staff.
Stimulate professional growth while in service.

Teachers who work part time for this school district or a fractional port~onof the
normal 190 full-day contract shall be given a corresponding fractional proportion of ihe
yearly increment.

2.

When a teacher assurnes a full 190-day contract position, all fractional years of
3
service for this scliool district shall be added, and the sum shall reflect increment
placement on the salary schedule. All remainders shall be treated as a full-year
mcrement. For example: A teacher w11o teaches half-lime for three (3) years would be
credited with two (2) years upon accepting a full-time job.
Definition of Credit: Tbe salary schedule shall be a semester unit schedule
Conversion of quarter credits to semester units shall be on a 213 computation.

4.

Definition of Unacceptable Course Work: Courses which have been (a) taken for
5.
audit; (b) repeated courses; (c) taken at non-accredited institutions; and, (d) failed or
listed as incomplete are not acceptable for advancement.
Verification of Earned Credits: Official transcripts from the granting university or
6.
college are fAe only acceptable verification of earned credits. Transcripts must be
received by the admiicstration not later than 0ctober 1 for advancement unless otherwise
by the administration.
Advancement on the Salary Schedule by New Employees: Only those credits
7.
earned after the date of teacher certification or award of a Bachelor Degree in Education
will be acceptable for salary advancement.

8.

The salary schedule shalI be in effect as set fort11 iil Appendix A for the 20032004 school year. The salary schedule shall be in effect as set forth in Appendix
C fiom September i , 2004 though December 3 i, 2004. The salary schedule shall
be in effect as set forth in Appendix D fioin Jsuiuary 1,2005 through August 3 1,
2005.

Page 15
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APPENDIX A
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 285
TEACHER...................
SALARYSCHEDULE
"....*
. 2003-2004
.-.v...-

MA O. r t l A '
+ 32 . . . . . . . . .
: . . . . . . . . . . ,. . . . . . .
~~

EXP

1-

.

I:

iT

BA Or B S.
. . .. .

1.000

$24,002

B A t 16

1.045

.

.

$25,082:

1.090

Page I8

'

$26,162

mr+16.*o.i". ....
BA
. .+ 48 . . .

1.135

$27,242;

PKu,
+ 32
Or BA+ 64
. . . .
1.180

i

$28,322

.

MASTER AGREEMENT

For 2006-2007

between the

POTLATCH EDUCATION ASSOCIATION

an affiliate of the
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
."

and the
NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION

and the

BOARD OF TRUSTEES

ARTICLE I
RECOGNITION

1 .1

Parties and Purpose
This Agreement is between the Board, o f Trustees of Potlatch School
District 285 located in Potlatch, ldaho and in Latah County (hereinafter
inafter
..
-".-~
"Association")
icitems to be
bargained between the parties pursuant to the provisions o f ldaho Law.

1.2

Recosnition
The Board recognizes the Association as the sole and exclusive
negotiating agent for the purposes of negotiations with certificated
Professional Employees of the District so long as the Association has the
approval of the majority of the professional employees o f the District to
so represent them.
1.

Exclusions
The following certificated employees of the District are excluded
from representation by the Association:
a.

b.
c.
d.
e.
2.

Superintendent
Assistant Superintendent
Principals
Vice Principals
Directors

Additional Exclusions

.....

ARTICLE Vlll
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

1.

A grievance shall be defined as a written allegation of a violation,
misinterpretation or misapplication of the terms of this Agreement.

grievance i s submitted less than ten (1 0) days before the close of
the current school term, time limits shall consist of all weekdays in
order that the matter may be resolved before the close of the
school term or as soon thereafter as possible. School days for the
purposes of the grievance procedure shall mean teacher
employment days.

3.

8.2

Grievances shall not be denied based upon the degree of
completeness o f the grievance form. (Appendix B)

Riahts to Representation
A t least one (1) Association representative shall be present at any
meeting, hearing, appeal, or other proceeding relating t o a grievance
which has been formally presented. Nothing contained herein shall be
construed as limiting the right of any employee having a grievance to
discuss the matter informally with the supervisor and having the
grievance adjusted without intervention of the Association, provided the
Association has been notified and the adjustment is not inconsistent with
the terms of this agreement.

8.3

Procedure

The parties acknowledge that it is usually most desirable for an employee
and the immediately involved supervisor t o resolve problems through
free and informal communications. When requested by the employee, the
building representative may accompany the teacher to'assist in the
formal resolution of the grievance. If, however, such informal processes
fail to satisfy rhe teacher or the Association, a grievance may be
processed as follows:

1.

The employee or the Association may present the grievance in
writing (using Appendix 6) w.jthin fifteen ( 1 5) calendar days dfthe
incident giving rise to the grievance r@the supervisor immediately
involved who will arrange for a meeting to take place within four (4)
days after receipt of the grievance. The Association's
representative, the aggrieved employee, andthe immediately
involved supervisor shall be present for the meeting. i h e
supervisor shall provide a written answer to the grievance to the
aggrieved employee and the Association within two (2) days after
the meeting. This answer shall include the reasons for the
decision.

2.

If the grievance is not resolved at Step No. 1, then the Association
shall refer the grievance to the superintendent or the
superintendent's official designee within six (6) days after the
receipt of the Step No. 1 answer. The superintendent shall arrange
for a meeting with the grievant and his/her representatives to take
place within four (4) days o f hislher receipt of the appeal. The
superintendent shall provide a written answer to the grievance to
the aggrieved employee and the Association within two (2) days
after the meeting. This answer shall include the reasons for the
decision.

3.

if thegrievance is not resolved at Step No. 2, then the Association
$b${[ ?@yerthe gii&&ficc to f h k Bigrd :of Trustees within six (6) days

after the receipt of the Step No. 2 answer. The Chairman of the
Board of Trustees shall arrange for a meeting with the grievant and
his/her representatives to take place within four (4) days of hisiher
receipt of the appeal. The Chairman of the Board of Trustees shall
provide a written answer to the grievance t o the' aggrieved
employee and the Association within two (2) days after the
meering. This answer shall include the reasons for the decision.

8.4

Procedure Ev-Pass

Grievances involving the Superintendent, o r grievances involving
decisions made by the Board, m a y b e initially filed by the Association at
Step No. 2.
8.5

Riqht to Representation b~ Grievant
The Board acknowledges the right of the Association's grievance
representative to participate in the processing of a grievance at any of the
three Steps described above, and no employee shall be required to
discuss any grievance if the Association's representative i s not present.

8.6

Riqht to Re~resentationbv Association
When an employee i s not represented by the Association, the Association
shall have the right to have its representative present at any stage of the
grievance procedure only when the grievance specifically addresses an
issue regarding this Master agreement. Non-members may not be
refused the right to Association representation if they so request.

8.7

Grievance lnvestiqation
The Board and the administration shall cooperate with the Association in
its investigation of any grievance within the limits established by Idaho
law.

8.8

Non-Reprisal Clause
No reprisals of any kind shall be taken by the Board or the administration
against any employee because of the employee's participation in this
grievance procedure.

8.9 Released Time for Grievance Administration
Should the investigation or processing of any grievance require that an
employee or an Association representative be released from hislher
regular assignment, said employee and/or representative shall be
released without loss of pay or benefits.
8.1 0 Grievance Files

All documents, communications, and records dealing with the processing
of a grievance shall be filed separately from the personnel files of the
participants.
8.1 1 Withdrawal of Grievances

A grievance may be withdrawn at any level without establishing
precedent.

10.3 Farnilv IilnessIFuneral Leave
1.

Immediate Familv Illness
Upon proper notification to the building administrator, certificated
personnel shall be granted leave of absence at full pay for serious
illness in their immediate family (spouse, children, brother, sister,
mother and father) not to exceed three (3) days per year. This
leave is non-cumulative. Upon exhaustion of family leave,
certificated personnel may utilize their available sick leave if
needed.

2.

Funerals
Upon proper notification to the building administrator, certificated
personnel shall be granted leave of absence at full pay to attend
funerals, not to exceed three (3) days per year. This leave i s noncumulative.

10.4 Personal Leave

Upon approval o f the building administrator, certificated personnel shall
be granted leave of absence at full pdyfor business hat cannot be
con..&&tc$ fkrhgh s.th.6ol 1s (iot.in $@ss.i~fi:
This allowance shall not
exceed four (4) days per year. Each certifitated employee may carry 'to
the next school year, up to one (1) personal leave day. Aggregate total
for any one year is not to. exceed five (5). ' i h ' . ~p8pt-y reruesting the leave
mustp@6$'i& 24 hours notice to the bui1din.g pri.ni.pul. Employees who
extend personal leave beyond their aggregate total of days will have
11.190th of their contract pay deducted. fromtheir salary.
10.5 Professional Leave

personnel wishes t o be absent from duty for a brief period to attend a
prof@ssinnafmeeting., to visit schools, or otherwise pursue prof6Ssiqnai
devel~:pment,a written request for approval of such absence S-hbuld be
signed by the Principal and fried in the Superintendent's office a t l e a s t
SW@ (2) -days
. prior t o the first day of anticipated a:bsence. Professional ' .
leave is not to exceed two (2) days per year and is non-cumulative. The
Principal may make exceptions on the number of days allowed when
necessary.

ARTICLE XV
SALARY

15.1 Salarv Schedule
1.

The Board and the Association shall establish a salary schedule for
the several professional positions in the school district that will:

A.

Attract to this school district the best candidates available.

6.

Give stability to the professional staff.

C.

Stimulate professional growth while in service.

2.

Teachers who work part time for this school district or a fractional
portion of the normal 190 full-day contract shall be given a
corresponding fractional proportion of the yearly increment.

3.

When a teacher assumes a full 190-day contract position, all
fractional years of service for this school district shall be added,
and the sum shall reflect increment placement on the salary
schedule. All remainders shall be treated as a full-year increment.
For example: A teacher who teaches half-time for three (3) years
would be credited with two (2) years upon accepting a full-time
job.

4.

Definition of Credit: The salary schedule shall be a semester unit
schedule. Conversion of quarter credits to semester units shall be
on a 213 computation.

5.

Definition of Unacce~tableCourse Work: Courses which have been
(a) taken for audit; (b) repeated courses; (c) taken at non-

accredited institutions; and (d) failed or listed as incomplete are not
acceptable for advancement.
6.

Verification of Earned Credits: Official transcripts from the
granting university or college are the only acceptable verification of
earned credits. Transcripts must be received by the administration
not later than October 1 for advancement unless otherwise
permitted by the administration.

7.

Advancement on the Salarv Schedule bv New Em~lovees:Only
those credits earned after the date of teacher certification or award
of a Bachelor Degree in Education will be acceptable for salary
advancement.

8.

The salary schedule shall be in effect as set forth in Appendix A.

APPENDIX A
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 285
POTLATCH, IDAHO
TEACHER SALARY SCHEDULE 2006-2008

POTLATCH SCHOOL .m.TST
)

APPEPSDUL B
GRKEVANCE REPORT FORM
Aggrieved Person Potlatch Teacher
School Potlatch Elemen~lSeniorHi&

Date Filed6/7/07
Subject area or Grande Profession$ Leave

1. Date Grievance Occurred Week of Mav 10"

2. Statement of Grievance: Doug Ncharcls requestqd that his leave on May 3* be
considered professional leave. Mr. Kren denied that request and instead classilied
it as personai leave.
3. Action Requested ox Relief Sought ( a w h additional sheet, if necessaxy): We the
PEA would like to request t b t Doug Richard's leave on May 3* be considered
professional instead of personal leave.
Reasons: Be was using the day to defend and present his final project for fors
master's in education degree at the University of Idaho in Coeur d' Alene. As per
our contractual agreement in 10.5, "If any certificated pmsonnel wishes to be
absent from duty for a brief period .to attmd a professional meeting, to visit
schools, or otherwise pursue professional development. .." Doug was in the
putsuit of professional devebpxaent.

k.;./
~iggiiturehfkggieved

LEVEL 1

V

2. Aggrieved Person's Rcponse:

Date

PAGE

Signam of Principal or Immediate Supervisor
Date

I accept the above decision.

\,/
procedure.

I hereby refer the above?decision to the next s t q of the grievance

03

POTLATCH SCHOOL RTST

Potlatch School Distticl: No. 285
130 Sixth St.
potlatch, ID 83855-8757

District Office
Elementary School
Jr.-Sx. &gh Sohool
FAX

MEMO To:
FROM:

DATE:
SUBJECT:

Grievance - ProfessionaVPersonai Leave

Thank you for the oppomnity to meet with you on June 18,2007, 1am writing to inform
you that &er reviewing the issues concerning ihe Potlatch Education AssociEition's
grievmce requesting Doug Richards'leave on May 3,2007 is considered professional
leave instead of personal leave, I am denying said request.

1do not believe that defending a final project for one's Master's in Elducational
Administration comes under the intent of the Professional Development language in our
current negotiated agreement.

PAGE 04

(208)875-0327
(208)875-133 1
(208)875-1231
(208)875-1028

Mjtdatne Chair and members of the Potlatch School Board:
We are writing this letter .to you inregard to athird step of a formal grievance on behalf of
tbe Potlatch Education Association, A grievance may have a negative coanotation that it
should not. It is ow belief that such a process should be in place so that problems in our
district need not fester but have o p p o W Q for W e resolution. So, on behdlf of the
Association, we wish to thank you for tsking your time to consider this co~~tracmal
disagreement. WhiIe the grievance itself is enclosed, in this letter we wish to add further
comments to the gzievance up to rhis step for your consideration.

It is our belicftbat Mt. Riohard's absence on May 3 clearly falls within both "the spirit" and
"htenf' of the professional development "languagemor~"clause" of the cment negotiated
agreement and we wish to defer14 Mr. Richards' request to have that day recognized as
professional leave, Mr. Richards did not request any other prof~ssionalleave ihroughout the
year and such leave (as opposed to person& leave which he was granted) creates no
additional burden, f h b c i a l or otherwise, upon the district. In fact, the cdrnhation of Mr.
Richards' Master's degree brings additional income to the district through the state
reimbursement dotlocation table, It would seem unduly opportunistic of the district to take
advantage of one of its stafimembers by refking to achow'edge his success and forcing
him to take personal leave, yet reaping the benefits ofhis professiond development. As %s
sitiration kth Mr. 5 5 c h d s now rests, the district has an unfair advantage in.gaining
professional development for the district while not making any contribution finanoiafly or
olherwi+ to a person who has furthered his professional developme~tand hence the
fort!.~coming improvement of the district.
While leave approvals must oope &om the principal concerning teacher absences, nrt-where
in the language of the Master Agreement oonoeming jprofessioid leave does it suggest that
Ihe administxation (principal, superintendent or board) has the sole right to determine what
professional &eyelopmentis. The professional himself/herself clearly should be left to m&e
that determination yJit$n reason of the teaching profession, and,& limitation oftwo days if
they have not already been affoded professional development,opportunities. Mr. Richards
was not given that opportunity and, by Master Agxeement lainguage, he should be given tbe
pmfessional courtesy of makinihis own decision. The intent of this language was to prevent
exactly what h a , in fact, happened in this instance. Tho language was crafted and agreed
upon in its cwent form to allow the individual empioyees 10pursue their own professional
development while fuly considering the desires of the adnliniskation for professional
development of empfoyoes in regard.to partioular concerns of their buildiig or the district.
Therefore we are asking you to g a i t M. Richards professional leave in
ofpersonal
leave for his Nay 3 absence as he had odginally requested, Tbis res~1utionof a language
disagreement would be in keeping v&h the spirit of the Naster.Agreernent lanpaga +s the
PEA originally negotiated with the board.

01/1,4/2008 11:06
,

i
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POTLATCH SCHOOL '"ST

208875107P.>
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~

Potlatch school District NO.285
130 Sixth St.
Potlatch, ID 838554757

~isb;ic~'~ffice
Eiemeentary School
Jr.+Sr.High School
FAX

PAGE 07

(208)875-0327
(208)875-1331
(208)875-1231
(zoe)s7s-zozs

June 27,2007

Mr. Brian Potter
Po$latch Education Asscoiation
I30 6" Street
Potlatch, ID 83855

RE!

-

Pe%cnaVPrafessir~nE1Leave Grievance Schoal Board Response

Dear Mr. Potter:

the o p p r i d t y fa m t on June 26,2007 to discuss tbe @wmm filed by the Potlatch
Education Association. In the as so cia tic^^'^ grievance orighlly filed on June 7,2007, action
requested or relief sought by the association was that Mr. Doug Richard's Ieave on May 3d be
ons side red profksswd leave instead of pmnal leave. Afcer cimfiil wnsidemtion by the four Potlatch
School Board trustees present, the board voted to &urn the decision of the administration and deny the
request of the Potlatch Education Association that Mr. Richard's leave on May 3'd ke coxxddered
pro%sswd leave instead of persod leave.
Tfisnk you &I

IQmaking this dtcisioon,the boad of ttustees agreed that the presentation of a poafolio h a graduate
class setting does pot constitute B pmfessional meeting, nor does it come under the clause of attending
another school; the request did not meet the criteria fbr pro%ssional leave. In addition, the negotiated
agreement requires that my leave be requested by the employee and subsequently approved by the
principal. Approval wxs give& however that classification ox accounting o f the time i s left up to the
discretion of the Administration. Nothkg in the contract grants to the employee the right to declare how
rhe time i s accounted for by the district. The evidence presented Mjcated that a request was made by
M?. Richards to zwunt fbrthe t h e as professional leave, it was deniod by tile principal and then the
superintendent.

That& you again Tor the opportunity to m e t a . work h u g h this & r i e ~ ~ nproczss.
ce

Chiyertwn of the Board

Potlatch School District Ro. 285
130 Sixth St.
Potlatch,ID 83855-8757

District Ofiice
(208)875-0327
Elementary School (208)875-1331
h i - ~ rHigh
.
school (208)875-1231
FAX
(208)875-1028

Mr. Brim Potter
President, Potlatch Education Association
130 6" Street
Pothtch, ID 83855

Re: Binding Arbitrarion

Mi-,Potter,
o n October 11,2007, Superintendent Joseph A. ICren reported to the Potlatch School Board of
Tmtees that a meeting took p h e M e e n you, Ms. Patty RobSfS and Mr. Kien. During that
meeting, Ms. Roberts, spaking on your W s t a t e d that in the matter of the grievauee
reviewed by the Potlatch School District Baard of Trustees on June 26,2007 tZLe Potlatch
Teacher Association, after d e w by assoohtion counsel, feels they have a strong case to
dispute the decision rendered by the Potlatch Board. Ms. Roberts went on to say thatthn
association would be agreeable to settling this disagreement &ugh binding a r b ~ o n .
It is tl~eopinion of the bomd that the decision to deny the request of the Potlatch Education
Association for a c e ~ s e employee's
d
leave on May 3,2007 be considered pro&ssiomI leave
instead ofwsonal leave is correct. We therefore decline your request for b i i arbitration
in this matter,

- ~ & dL.
i Davis
Chairperson of the Board

*~.
...

;

2008 Contract hTegotiations
1/14/08
Potlatch School Distict Board of Trustees Proposal #M
The Potlatch School ~ i s 6 i cBoard
t
of Trustees proposes the following lanopage be added.
to' Article X,paragraph 10.5 Professional Leave: Professional Development means
activities which sustain a certifidated personnel's professional competence by keeping the
cer'ci-ficated personnel infonned of, and able to comply with, developments of
professional standards in all functions in which the certificated personnel practices or in
which the certificated personnel is relied upon because of the certificated personnel's
calling.

In addition, as defined by Title IX,Part A, Section 910l'of the NO Child Lefi Behind Act,
Professional Development Activities includes activities that:
(i)
..

improve and increase teachers' knowledge of the academic subjects the teachers
teach, and enable teachers to become highly qualified;
.....

(ii)

are an integral part of broad schoolwide and di.strictwide educational
improvement plans;

(iii)

give teachers, principals, and admi~listratorsthe knowledge and skills to provide
students with the opportxnity to meet challenging State academic content
standards and student academic achievement standards;

(iv)

improve classroom management skills;

(v)

(I
are
)
high qualiiy, sustained, intensive, and classroom-focused in order to have
a positive and lasting impact on classroom insbxction and the teacher's
performance in the classroom; and
(I0are not 1-day or short-term workshops or conferences;

(vi)

support the recruiting, bving,aid &training of highly qualified teachers, including
teachers who became highly qualified t!nro&~ State and local alternative routes to
certification;

(vii)

advance teacher understanding of effective inslructional strategies that are based on scientifically based research; and
(I)
strategies for improving student academic achievement or
(Q
substantially increasing the knowledge and teaching skills of
teachers; and

I

(viii)

are aligned with and directly related to State academic content standards, student academic achievement
(I)
standards, and assessments; and

(ix)

are developed with emensive paxticipation of teachers, principals, parents, and
administrators of schools to be served under this Act;

(xi)

to the extent appropriate, provide training for teachers and ~"iacipalsin the use of
technology so that technology and technology applications are .effectivel~7used in
the classroom to improve teaching and learhing in the cunicula and core academic
subjects in which the teachers teach;

(xii)

as a whole, are regularly evaluated for their impact on increaed teacher
effectiveness and improved student academic achie~ement,witb the findings of
the evaluations used to improve the quality of professional de~elopment;

(xiii)

provide insrruction i
nmerhods of xeachg children with special needs;

(xiv)

include instruction in the use of data and assessments to infom and instruct
classroom practice; and

(m) include instruction in ways that teachers; principals, pupil services personnel, and
school administrators n a y work more effectively with parents.

John E. Rumel, Esq.
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
620 North Sixth Street
P.O. Box 2638
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 333-8560
Facsimile: (208) 344-1606

CLERK OF DigTSICT i G g ~ j

James M. Piotrowski, Esq.
Marty Durand, Esq.
HERZFELD & PIOTROWSKI, LLP
713 West Franlclin Street
P.O. Box 2864
Boise, Idaho 83701-2864
Telephone: (208) 33 1-9200
Facsimile: (208) 33 1-9201
Attorneys for Plaintzffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
POTLATCH EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS,
Plaintiff,
v.

POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.

1
1
1

Case No. CV2007-1151
NOTICE OF HEARING

1

1
)

285,

Defendants.

1
1

TO:

THE ABOVE-ENTITLED DEFENDANTS AND THEIR ATTORNEY OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 9" day of June, 2008, at 10.00 a.m, or as soon
thereafter as counsel can be heard at the Latah County Courthouse, Moscow, Idaho, before the
Honorable John R. Stegner, District Judge, Plaintiffs Potlatch Education Association and Doug

NOTICE OF HEARWG - I

Richards will call up for hearing their Motion to Strike Defendants' Jury Demand and Motion for
Summary Judgment.
DATl3D this

U"
day of May, 2008.

Y'WU\,

DAHO EDU

By:

NOTICE OF HEARING - 2

TXON

1

'
J

Fohn E. Rumel
Attorney for Plaintiff Potlatch Educatio~i
Associatio~land Doug Richards

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the q % a y of May, 2008, I caused a true and con-ect
copy of the foregoing to be served via:
U.S. Mail
Facsimile Trans
Band Delivered
to:
Brian K. Julian, Esq.
Davis VanderVelde, Esq.
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Facsimile: 344-55 10

/lg2&LLdJohn E. Rumel

NOTICE OF B E M G - 3

Qy/

IEA LEGAL SER!.

. . .

PaGE 02/04

i
,

23flfjHb,y 21 ti9 10: 56

Brian K. Julian - ISB No. 2360
Amy G.White - IS6 No. 501 9
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, ,Suite 700
Post Office Box 7428
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208)344-5800
Facsimile:
(208)344-55I0
E-Mail: biulian@aihlaw,com
awhite_@ajhlaw.co~

CLERK OF @$fiiCT COURT
L&TiiH CoUli'?i

.

.

P.ttorney~."for DEFENDANTS
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAW

POTLATCH EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS,
Plaintiff(s),

Case No. CV 2007-1151
STIPULATION TQ CONTINUE
ffEARiMG DATE

VS.

POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
285,

COME NOW the Plaintiffs and Defendants, by and through their
coclnsel of record, and based upon the following information, hereby
stipulate and agree that after the scheduling conference of Monday, March

3, 2008, counsel for the parties have Further discussed this case and have
determined that additional time for discovery is needed in order to insure
STIfPULATION TO CONTINUE HEARING DATE -1

TEA LEGAL SERU

PAGE 03/84

.S

i-

that all relevant evidence is discovered and produced.

The parties are

therefore requesting that the current, hearing date in this matter of June 9,
y this Honorable Court To June 30, 2008, with the relevant

to correlate the new hearing date and time.
DATED this

of May, 2008.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LtP

Idaho Education Association
A

STIIPULATION TO CONTINUE HEARING DATE -2

05/21/2008
C

21: 29

20834411 ,
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IEA LEGAL SERV.

..
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[

i

..

_ . . .. .

PAGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAiLLNG
i HEREBY CERTIFY that on f h i s ~ d of,
y May 2008, 1 sewad a
true and correct copy of the foregoing STIPULATION TO CONTINUE
NEARIAIG DATE by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of
follows:
record, by the method indicated below, ad
John E. Rurnel
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
620 North 2@38
Boise, ID 83701
.Te!ephone: (208) 333-8560
Facsimile: (208) 344-16 0 6
James M. Pioxrowski
Marty Durand
HERZFELD & PIOTROWSI<I, LLP
71 3 West Franklin Street

I I

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
1 Hand-~elivered
[ I overnight Mail
[d ~ a c s i r n i l e

[

I
I
1

1.

/

[
[

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Deiivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

P.O. Box 2864
Boise, Idaho 83701 -2864
Telephone: (208) 331 -9200
Facsimile: (208) 3 3 1 -9201

STllPULATlON TO CONTINUE HEARING DATE -3

000421

i

i ~ ;

CASE Nc;
Brian K. Julian - ISB NO.2360
Amy G. White - ISB No. 5019
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza "
250 South Fifth Street, Suite
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-580
Facsimile:
(208) 344-5510
E-Mail:
biulian@.aihlaw.com
awhite@aihlaw.com

.

(jgD7'-li
- .. ..
,

q

2QOB M y 28 ~ 8 . f2: 45
CLEM OF D~STR~CJT
GOUST
LATP,H CO!J~;Y
.

,..

By

:-..&~p{jp

Attorneys for DEFENDANTS
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
POTLATCH EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
and DOUG RICHARDS,
Case No. CV 2007-1 151
Plaintiff(s),
VS,

POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO 285,
and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POTLATCH
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 285

ORDER VACATING AND
RESETTING HEARING DATE

Upon Stipulation of the parties and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, and this does order, adjudge
and decree that the hearing
. currently set for June 9, 2008 be vacated and reset to

d

June 30, 2008 a t 10:OO a.m.(p$t)
DATED this

"fh

I#- day of May, 2008.
&

-

ORDER VACATING AND RESETTING HEARING DATE 1

QOUl22

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h i s a d a y of May, 2008, 1 served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Order Vacating and Resetfing Hearing by delivering
the same to each of the following attorneys of record, by the method indicated
below, addressed as follows:
John E. ~ u r n e l
Idaho Education Association
P.0, Box 2638
Boise, ID 83701
Brian I<. Julian
Anderson Julian & Hull
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707

[i] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ]
Hand-Delivered
[ ]
Overnight Mail
[ 1 Facsimile

[
[
[

]
]
]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

~ l e r k ' o fthe Court

ORDER VACATING AND RESETTING HEARING DATE - 2
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Brian K. Julian - ISB NO. 2 3 6 0
Amy G. White - ISB No. 5019
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
'C. W. Moore Plaza
2 5 0 south Fifth Street, Suite 7 0 0
P o s t 0 , f f i c Box 7 4 2 6
Boise, Idaho 8370717426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-551 0
E-Mail: biulian@aihlaw.com
awhite@aihlaw.com
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CLERK OF fi~~fi?!:;~
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Attorneys for DEFENDANTS
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

POTLATCH EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
and DOUG RICHARDS,

VS.

POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 285,
and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POTLATCH
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 285,

Case No. CV 2007-1 1 5 1
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND NONOPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO STRIKE DEMAND
FOR JURY TRIAL

COMES NOW, the above entitled Defendants, by and through their attorneys
of record, Anderson, Julian & Hull, and submits this Response t o Plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment and Non-Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion t o Strike Demand
for Jury Trial. Submitted contemporaneously is the Affidavit of Joseph Kren,
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND NONOPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1.

000125;

Superintendent of Potlatch School District, in Support of Defendants' Response t o
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.

INTRODUCTION
The essence of this case is the interpretation of the professional leave clause
o f the Master Agreement between the Potlatch Education Association and
Defendants. However, Plaintiffs interpretation of the professional leave clause
would turn the professional leave granted b y Defendants t o its certificated
employees into a form of personal leave, available not at the discretion of the
principal or site administrator, b u t at the discretion of the employee.
The professional leave clause is not ambiguous, and its plain language makes
i t clear that it is the prerogative of the principal t o decide whether professional
leave will be allowed. In this case, Defendants decided that professional leave
would n o t be granted because the reason for which the professional leave was
requested did not meet the guidelines of what professional leave was designed for.
In addition, Mr. Richards had taken multiple professional leave days prior t o the
M a y 3 date, and had exceeded the maximum of t w o allotted days. Thus, regardless
of what reason was given for requesting time off, Mr. Richards should have
requested that a personal day be used, as he w a s over the limit o f allowable
~ r o f e s s i o n aleave.
l
Ultimately,

a majority of Plaintiffs'

Motion for Summary Judgment is

irrelevant, as the only issue is the interpretation o f the professional leave clause.
Because Plaintiffs and Defendants agree that i t is unambiguous, extrinsic evidence
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND NONOPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2
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is not allowed and is unnecessary. This brief will present those issues discussed
above.
In addition,

Defendants do

not

oppose

Plaintiffs'

Motion

to

Strike

Defendants' Demand for Jury Trial, and will file no briefing in response.

11.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

t

Plaintiff Doug Richards is an employee of Defendant Potlatch School District,
No. 285. Affidavit of Doug Richards in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment,

7

1 (hereinafter cited as "Richards Affidavit"). Defendant Potlatch

School District has a master agreement w i t h the Potlatch Education Associat~on.
See Affidavit of Joseph Kren, Ex. A (hereinafter cited as "Kren Affidavit"). This

Master Agreement contains a professional leave clause, which states:
10.5 Professional Leave
Attendance at educational meetings or visiting other schools is
permitted at full pay if such absence is approved b y the Principal. If
any certificated personnel wishes t o be absent from duty for a brief
period t o attend a professional meeting, t o visit schools, or otherwise
pursue professional development, a written request for approval of
such absence should be signed b y the Principal and filed in the
Superintendent's office at least t w o (2) days prior t o the first day of
anticipated absence. Professional leave is n o t t o exceed t w o (2) days
per year and is non-cumulative. The Principal may make exceptions on
the number of days allowed when necessary.
Kren Affidavit, Ex. A. The Master Agreement, including the professional leave
clause, w a s negotiated b y t w o sophisticated parties in an arm's length transaction.
Kren Affidavit, ( 4. Both the Potlatch Education Association and Defendant
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Potlatch School District provided language used in the professional leave clause.
See Potter Affidavit, Ex. A
On October 6, 2006, Mr. ~ i c h a r d sw a s granted one day o f professional
leave. See Kren Affidavit, Ex. B . On December 8, 2006, Mr. Richards was granted

'/2 day of professional leave. See Kren Affidavit, Ex. B. On December 15, 2008,
Mr. Richards was granted three hours of professional leave. See Kren Affidavit, Ex.
B. On either February 1 5 or 16, 2007, Mr. Richards was granted one day of
professional leave. See Kren Affidavit, Ex. 5 . On May 3, 2007, Mr. Richards was
absent from his assigned duties, and the absence was assigned t o Mr. Richards'
personal leave. See Kren Affidavit, Ex. B. On or about May 18, 2007, Mr. Richards
was granted one half day of professional leave. See Kren Affidavit, Ex. B.
111.

LEGAL ARGUMENT
A.

LEGAL STANDARD
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the proper inquiry is

whether "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions o n file, together with the
affidavits, if any, s h o w that there is no genuine issue as t o any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter o f law." lRCP 56ic).
"The record is construed in the light most favorable t o the non-moving party, and
all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor o f that party." Carl H. Christensen
Family Trust v. Christensen, 1 3 3 ldaho 866, 8 7 0 (ldaho 1 9 9 9 ) . This includes
factual inferences. Herrera v. Conner, 1 1 1 ldaho 1012, 1 0 2 1 (Idaho Ct. App.
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In determining whether an issue of material fact is in dispute, facts
should be liberally construed in favor of the party against whom
summary judgment is sought and all doubts are t o b e resolved against
the moving party. . . . [A] motion for s'ummary judgment must be
denied i f the evidence is such that conflicting inferences can be draw
therefrom and if reasonable men might reach different conclusions.

Ashby v. Hubbard,'100 ldaho 67, 69 (Idaho 1979). "No dispute o f fact is deemed
within Rule 5 6 ( c ) unless it relates t o an issue disclosed b y the

"material"

pleadings." Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 ldaho 668, 669-670 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984).
If the contract at issue in this case is determined t o b e ambiguous, the
interpretation of the contract is a question of fact, which cannot be resolved o n
summary judgment. Carl H. Chrisfensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho

866, 873
B.

-

7 4 (ldaho 1999).

UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE PROFESSIONAL LEAVE CLAUSE,
THE
PRINCIPAL
HAS
DISCRETION
TO
DETERMINE
WHETHER
PROFESSIONAL LEAVE WILL BE GRANTED, AND THEREFORE PLAINTIFFS
CANNOT FORCE DEFENDANTS TO GRANT PROFESSIONAL LEAVE.
The professional leave clause in the Master Agreement does t w o things: it

gives examples of the types of reasons for which professional leave might be
granted, and it gives school district administrators discretion t o determine whether
t o grant professional leave time. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, seem t o be taking the
stand that professional leave must be granted i f a qualified employee requests it.
This interpretation,

however, is n o t only directly opposite the spirit of the

professional leave clause, but is directly contradictory t o i t s plain language. ldaho
contract l a w prevents such a result. This section will discuss t h e language of the
professional leave clause which gives the principal authority t o grant professional

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND NONOPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE D
RJURYTRIAL-5

000128

leave. Whether an activity qualifies for professional leave will be discussed in
subsequent sections.

1.

Where the Plain Languaqe of the Professional Leave Clause qives
There
is No Breach of Contract When Discretion is Exercised.

Plaintiffs have correctly pointed out "the primary responsibility of a court in
determining the requirements of contracts is t o ascertain the contracting parties'
intent." Plainfiffs'Mernorandum (citing Straub

v. Smith,

145 ldaho 65, 69 (2007)).

Contrary t o Plaintiffs' contentions, though, the parties' intent for an unambiguous
contract is n o t determined b y looking at extrinsic evidence such as drafts or
previous used clauses, or negotiation history. Intent is determined using i h e plain
language of the contract. "As an initial matter, this Court must determine the legal
effect of the parties' written contract. The interpretation of a contract begins with
the language o f the contract itself. I f the language o f the contract is unambiguous,
then its meaning and legal effect must be determined from its words." Cristo Viene
Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 1 6 0 P.3d 743, 7 4 7 (Idaho 2 0 0 7 ) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). See also independence Lead Mines Co. v. Hecla Mining
Co., 1 4 3 ldaho 2 2 , 2 6 (Idaho 2006) ("The interpretation of a contract begins with
the language o f the contract itself. If the terms of the contract are clear and
unambiguous, the meaning and legal effect of t h e contract are questions o f law
which must b e determined f r o m the plain meaning o f the words used.").
If the language used b y the parties is plain, complete, and
unambiguous, the intention of the pariies must be gathered f r o m that
language, and from t h a t language alone, no matter w h a t the actual or
secret intentions o f t h e parties may have been. Presumptively, the
intent of the parties t o a contract is expressed b y the natural and
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ordinary meaning o f their language referable t o it, and such meaning
cannot be perverted or destroyed by the courts through construction,
for the parties are presumed t o have intended what t h e terms clearly
state.
1 7 A Am. Jur. 2d CONTRACTS 5 348. The ldaho Supreme Court has clarified this
principal, stating
A party's subjective, undisclosed intent is immaterial t o the
interpretation of a contract, as under the objective l a w of contract
interpretation, the court will give force and effect t o t h e words o f the
contract without regard t o w h a t the parties t o the contract thought it
meant or what they actually intended for it t o mean. The court will not
attempt t o ascertain the actual mental processes o f the parties in
entering into the particular contract; rather the law presumes that the
parties understood the import of their contract and t h a t they had the
intention which its terms manifest.

J.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 1 6 7 P.3d 748, 7 5 1 (ldaho 2006) (quoting 1 7 A Am. Jur
2 d CONTRACTS

§

347).

The language of the professional leave clause is straightforward. It states
that "Attendance at educational meetings or visiting other schools is p e r m i t t e d at
full pay if such absence is approved b v the Principal." See Kren Affidavit, Ex. A.
This language clearly gives the principal discretion t o determine whether or n o t
professional leave will be granted. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, make several
interesting statements regarding Mr. Richards' right t o professional leave. For
example, "Richards was entifled t o use a Professional Leave day t o travel t o and
defend his final project for his Master's Degree." Plaintiff's Memorandum, p. 1.2
(emphasis added). Similarly, "the Professional Leave provisions of the Master
Agreement unambiguously required the School District t o approve Richards' request
t o use a professional leave day." Plaintiff's Memorandum, p. 1 1 . These assertions
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND NONOPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 7
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indicate that it is Plaintiffs' belief that professional leave must be given when it is
requested. The plain language of the professional leave clause surely does not
require such a result, particularly where discretion is vested in the principal, not the
ployee.
2.

I
n
r
e
e
m
e
n
t as a Whole, of All the types of
Leave, Only the Professional Leave Clause does n o t Require
Mandatorv Granting of Leave.

In malting their assertion that Mr. Richards w a s entitled t o personal leave,
Plaintiffs cite various canons of contract construction. See Plaintiffs'Memorandum,
p. 9. Another canon which is relevant t o this case is that "A contract must be
construed as a whole, and the intention of the parties is t o be ascertained from the
entire instrument." 1 7 A Am. Jur. 2 d CONTRACTS

§

375. See also Shawver v.

Huck/eberry Estates, L.L.C., 1 4 0 Idaho 354, 3 6 1 (Idaho 2 0 0 4 ) ("In determining the
intent of the parties, this Court must view the contract as a whole."). A review of
the entire contract shows that the intention of the parties w a s t o give discretion t o
grant professional leave t o the principal. There are several types of leave mentioned
in the Master Agreement. Regarding sick leave, the master agreement states
"Certificated personnel shaN be granted leave of absence for personal illness or
injury w i t h full pay ..." Kren Affidavit, Ex. A, p. 27 (emphasis added). Regarding
family illness leave, the Master Agreement states "Upon proper notification to the
building administrator, certificated personnel shall be granted leave of absence at
full pay for serious illness in their immediate family ..." Kren Affidavit, Ex. A, p. 2 9
(emphasis added). For funeral leave, the Master Agreement states "Upon proper
notification t o the building administrator, certificated personnel shall be granted
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND NONOPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 8
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leave of absence at full pay t o attend funerals ..." Kren ~ f f i d a v i f ,Ex. A, p. 2 9
(emphasis added). The Master Agreement similarly addresses leave for jury duty,
military service, and Association leave, in each case affirmatively s
ypes of leave "shall" be given. Kren Affidavit, Ex. A, p. 31.
The Master Agreement also addresses

personal leave,

stating "Upon

approval o f the building administrator, certificated personnel shall be granted leave
of absence at full pay ..." Kren Affidavit, Ex. A, p. 2 9 (emphasis added). Unlike the
previously discussed types of leave, the building administrator must give approval
before personal leave is granted. However, once the approval is given, granting
personal leave is mandatory, as indicated b y the "shall" language
Professional leave is different from every other type of leave mentioned in
the Master Agreement. There is no "shall" language in the professional leave clause
which requires that professional leave be granted; in fact, the language is quite
permissive, stating that professional leave "is permitted

... if such absence is

approved b y the Principal." Kren Affidavit, Ex. A, p. 29 (emphasis added). This
language does not equate t o Plaintiffs' interpretation o f the professional leave
clause, which apparently would read "when a certificated employee identifies an
activity that the employee has determined qualifies for

professional leave,

professional leave shall be granted." Plaintiffs' interpretation of the professional
leave clause would nullify any discretion given t o the principal in the clause, and
would effectively turn The professional leave allowance into a mandatory personal
leave requirement.
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Without professional leave, a certificated employee has 24 days of paid leave
that must be given (not including unlimited leave for jury duty) and which
Defendants are obligated t o provide.'

Plaintiffs are attemptin

discretionary nature of the professional leave clause, and cr
mandatory leave days simply based on an employee's determination that the leave
would be for a professional purpose.
In construing the Master Agreement as a whole, it is clear that the intent of
the professional leave clause is different from the other types of leave. The plain
language for sick leave, personal leave, and the other various types of leave
indicates that these leaves are mandatory, and Defendant School District has no
discretion in whether they should be granted. In contrast, the professional leave
language is very permissive, in that there is no requirement that professional leave
be given. The plain, unambiguous language, states that professional leave may be
granted by the administration. The facts of this case show t h a t Mr. Richards had
been granted professional leave o n multiple occasions prior t o the request for May

3, b u t for that particular date professional leave was not granted. This was within
the discretion of Defendant School Dislrict, and therefore Plaintiffs have no right

10

demand that the decision t o classify Mr. Richards: leave o n M a y 3, 2007 be
nullified and that the leave be reclassified as professional leave. Where discretion
was exercised when discretion is contractually given, there is n o breach of
7

The Master Agreement requires that Defendants provide 1 1 days of paid sick leave, 3 days
of paid famiiy sick leave, 3 days of funeral leave, 4 days of personal leave, and 3 days of
association leave. See Kren Affidavit, Ex. A, pp. 27' - 31. This calculation does not include
accumulated sick leave, on which there is no limit, accumulated personal leave, which may
accumulate t o 5 days per year, and accumulated association leave, which may accumulate up to 76
days per year.

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND NONOPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

-

10

000133-

contract. Therefore Defendants respectfully request that Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment be denied.
C.

THE LANGUAGE OF THE PROFESSIONAL LEAVE REQUIREMENT DOES NOT
REQUIRE THAT PROFESSIONAL LEAVE BE GIVEN FOR A CERTIFICATED
EMPLOYEE TO PURSUE EDUCATIONAL ADVANCEMENT.
Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Richards was "entitled" t o professional leave

because the "defense of his final project for his Master's Degree in Education from
the University of ldaho clearly constituted pursuit o f professional development."

Plaintiffs' Memorandum, p. 9. This argument ignores the discretionary aspect of
the professional leave clause, and focus solely on whether Mr. Richards' reason for
requesting professional leave qualifies for professional leave. While this argument is
almost completely irrelevant t o a determination of whether there has been a breach
of contract, Defendants are compelled t o address the issue as it is the focus of
Plaintiffs' Complaint.
Both the first and second sentence in the professional leave clause address
reasons w h y professional leave may be granted: "Attendance a t educational
meetings o r visiting other schools is permitted

. . . . If any certificated personnel

wishes t o be absent from d u t y for a brief period to a t l e n d a professional meeting,
to visit schools, o r otherwise pursue professional development, a written request
for approval [is required]." Kren Affidavit, Ex. A (emphasis added). The other t w o
sentences do not address w h a t qualifies for professional leave. Thus, professional
leave may be granted for attendance at educational or professional meetings, t o
visit schools, or to pursue professional development.
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The simple f a c t is that there is nothing in the professional leave clause that
indicates that it applies t o Mr. Richards' master's degree. Plaintiffs argue that the
phrase "professional development" includes educational advancement, and is
identical t o the term "professional growth" used in a different clause in the Master
Agreement. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, p. 10. In malting this connection, Plaintiffs
rely on the maxim "where nothing in the context indicates otherwise, words used
in one sense in one Dart of the contract are deemed t o have been used in the same
sense in another, part of the same instrument." Plaintiffs' Memorandum, p. 9
(quoting Bair v. Barron, 9 7 Idaho 2 6 , 3 0 ( 1 9 7 5 ) ) .
In making this argument, Plaintiffs seek t o compare the professional leave
clause, which gives specific examples o f reasons to grant professional leave, w i t h
an article of Master Agreement dealing w i t h salaries, which are based o n
experience and education. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum, p. 10.

ow ever,

there are

distinguishing features which prevent the terms "professional development" and
"professional growth" from being interpreted identically. Primarily, the context is so
dissimilar that they can't mean the same thing. "Professional growth" is used in the
context of salaries. Article XV (Salary) of the Master Agreement specifically states
that the purpose of the salary schedule is t o "stimulate professional growth while in
service." Kren Affidavit, Ex. A, p. 45. To match this purpose, 'pay is based on
experience and o n educational attainments. In this context, the term "professional
growth" is connected w i t h an intention t o promote education.
To contrast, the term "professional development" is n o t connected with
educational advancement, but is connected with "professional meetings" and
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"visit[ing] schools". Kren Affidavit, Ex. A, p. 30. A s can be seen from M r . Richards'
reasons for professional leave throughout the 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 7 school year,

he

understood this. In October, 2006,

ards toolc professional leave for

inservice regarding music at the Un

Idaho. Kren Affidavit, Ex. B. In

December, Mr. Richards' requests for personal leave involved a concert rehearsal
and a Christmas program. Kren Affidavit, Ex. B. The professional leave granted in
February, 2 0 0 7 involved a music event in Portland, Oregon. Kren Affi'davif, Ex. 8.
These events are professional meetings or visiting schools. The point of the
professional leave clause is n o t t o allow Mr. Richards t o finish school; finishing his
education was Mr. Richards' responsibility, not Defendants', and should be done on
Mr. Richards' personal time, as it is n o t directly related t o his employment with
Defendant School District. Defendant School District has provided its certificated
employees w i t h ~nultiple"personal" days which are designed t o address exactly
such situations, namely "business that cannot be conducted when school is not in
session." Kren Affidavf't, Ex. A, p. 29. Thus, Mr. Richards was required t o use
personal leave, and n o t professional leave. In making the comparison between
"professional growth" and "professional purpose", Plaintiffs are trying t o equate
two

situations

altin t o

comparing

apples

with

Chihuahuas;

while

various

connections can be drawn, such a comparison isn't helpful.
This analysis of the context shows that the language of the professional
leave clause and the Master Agreement as a whole does not tend toward an
interpretation

which

would

allow

time

needed

for

personal

educational

advancement t o be taken off in the form of professional leave. As stated above,
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personal educational advancement is provided for through personal leave time.
Professional leave i s specifically designed t o provide paid leave for events that
employees

would

not

be obligated

to

attend

but

for

their

professional

responsibilities, including "educational ~neetingsor visiting other schools." Kren
Affidavit, Ex. A, p. 29. Though Mr. Richards' decision t o obtain a master's degree
will ultimately affect his employment w i t h Defendant School District (in that i t will
cause an increase in his pay), there is no evidence showing that Mr. Richards
decision t o get his master's degree is related t o his professional responsibilities.
Defendant School District recognized this when they informed Mr. Richards that the
presentation o f his master's degree project did n o t "fall under the spirit of the
professional development clause." Poffer Affidavit, Ex. E. There is a difference
between continuing education for professionals and primary education t o complete
a degree. Professional leave is designed for the former, and personal leave is
available for the latter. Therefore there is no breach o f contract b y denying Mr.
Richards the use o f professional leave, particularly w h e n he had exhausted his
professional leave, for personal educational advancement. A s such, Plaintiffs are
entitled t o no equitable relief, and summary judgment should be denied
D.

THERE ARE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT REGARDING H O W MUCH
PROFESSIONAL LEAVE MR. RICHARDS H A D TAKEN PRIOR TO M A Y 3,
2007, A N D THEREFORE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS INAPPROPRIATE.

Plaintiffs have indicated that Mr. Richards requested only t w o professional
leave days during the 2006-2007 school year. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, p. 4;
Richards Affidavit,
allegation

is

1 4.

accurate.

There appears t o be a factual dispute as t o whether this
Defendants'

records show

that

Mr.

Richards took
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professional leave on October 6, 2006 (1 day), December 8, 2 0 0 6 ( % day),
December 15, 2 0 0 6 ( 3 hours, or 318 day), and February 1 5 or 1 6 (1 day). Kren
Ex. B. Thus before Mr. Richards requested professional leave for May 3,
had taken 2.875 professional leave days.
This is significant because the professional leave clause clearly states that
"Professional leave is not t o exceed t w o (2) days per year and is non-cumulative.
The Principal may make exceptions on the number of days allowed when
necessary.'"

Kren Affidavit, Ex. A. As it is clear that it is discretionary whether

professional leave is granted, it is possible that part of the consideration in
determining that Mr. Richards would n o t be granted professional leave for May 3,
2 0 0 7 was that he had already been granted more than the amount o f professional
leave that was allowed. While n o t stated as such a reason in the communications
between Mr. Richards and Defendants, s u c h a consideration is a factor, and cannot
be discounted. Therefore, since Mr. Richards was already over the amount of
allowable days, and even assuming Plaintiffs' contention that De.fendants were
obligated l o grant professional leave days should the employee claim t h e leave was
for a professional purpose, leave could not have been granted because there was
no available leave. Defendants did not violate the terms of the Master Agreement,
while i n contrast Mr. Richards attempted t o do so b y requesting more professional

2

Once again; this language shows the discretionary nature of this clause. The Principal is
allowed t o decide whether and when more professional leave should be granted. This clearly shows
that professional leave is not mandatory, and therefore there can be no breach when professional
leave is denied.
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leave than was allowed. The result is that Superintendent Kren properly enforced
the contract b y requiring t h a t personal leave be taken.
The determination o f whether Mr. Richards had taken more than t w o days of
fessional leave prior t o May 3, 2 0 0 7 is a dispute of material fact, as it is
relevant t o a determination of whether Mr. Richards w a s even entitled t o take
professional leave.

Because there is an issue of material fact, summary judgment

should not be granted. Palmer v, ldaho Bank & Trust, 1 0 0 ldaho 642, 644 (Idaho
1979).
E.

THE MASTER AGREEMENT M A Y NOT BE CONSTRUED MOST STRONGLY
AGAINST DEFENDANT SCHOOL DISTRICT A S THE PARTIES WERE
SOPHISTICATED PARTIES WHO NEGOTIATED A T ARM'S LENGTH, A N D
BOTH PARTIES CONTRIBUTED LANGUAGE TO THE CONTRACT.
Plaintiffs contend t h a t the Master Agreement, including the professional

leave clause, must be construed most strongly against Defendant School District,
based on t h e axiom that where there is "doubtful language in the contract,

ir

will

be interpreted m o s t strongly against the party who provided that language."

Plainfiffs' Memorandum, p. 9 . In support of this argument, Plaintiffs contend that
"the PEA and School Board's bargaining history reveals that the School Board
proposed t h e language of the version of the Professional Leave provisions that
ultimately ended u p in the Master Agreement." Plaintiffs' Memorandum, p. 11.
However, t h e side-by-side comparison of the proposed professional leave clauses
by both the School Board and the PEA shows that neither proposed clause w a s
ultimately used. Poffer Affidavif, Ex. A. The professional leave clause, as with the
rest o f the Master Agreement, was n o t the result of unequal bargaining power or
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an adhesion contract b y Defendants,

but was a negotiated agreement b y

sophisticated parties w i t h language being provided b y both sides. Kren Affidavit, q/

4. Therefore the maxim o n which Plaintiffs rely does n o t apply.
In any case, the language ultimately used in the professional leave clause
does not match the proposed language b y either party. There is no evidence as t o
w h o actually provided such language. Since it cannot be determined from the facts
before this court which party provided the language in the current professional
leave clause, there is a material issue of f a c t regarding this issue. As such,
summary judgment would be inappropriate.
F.

IF THE PROFESSIONAL LEAVE CLAUSE IS AMBIGUOUS, SUMMARY
JUDGMENT CANNOT BE GRANTED AS THE DETERMINTION OF INTENT IS
A QUESTION OF FACT.
Plaintiffs and Defendants fundamentally disagree regarding the application of

the professional leave clause. A s discussed above, Plaintiffs' arguments indicate
that they believe that professional leave must be granted i f the certificated
employee identifies a reason which the employee believes qualifies for professional
leave. Defendants' interpretation follows the language of the professional leave
clause, which gives Defendant School District the discretion t o determine whether
leave is appropriately classified as professional leave, and discretion t o grant
professional leave. A fundamental disagreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of a contract need not result in a conclusion that the clause over
which the disagreement arose is ambiguous. Rather, for a contract term t o be
ambiguous, "there m u s t be at least t w o different reasonable interpretations of the
term, or i t must be nonsensical." Swanson v. Beco Constr. Co., 175 P.3d 748,
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND NON-

7 5 1 (Idaho 2 0 0 7 ) (internal citations omitted). The question o f whether there is an
ambiguity in a contract is a question of law, and is therefore appropriately
determined on summary judgment. Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 1 4 0
Idaho 354, 362 (2004). However, if an ambiguity does exist, t h e resolution of the
ambiguity is a question of fact which may not be resolved o n summary judgment.
ld.
Plaintiffs' and Defendants' interpretations of t h e professional leave clause
surely conflict. Plaintiffs' interpretation relnoves discretion t o grant professional
leave, and Defendants' interpretation allows fo'r discretion t o grant professional
leave. Despite this conflict, Plaintiffs contend that there is no ambiguity in the
professional leave clause. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum, p. 1 1 . Defendants agree,
however this because Defendants believe that Plaintiffs' interpretation of the
professional leave clause is unreasonable, in that it completely strips Defendant
School District o f any discretion t o grant or deny professional leave as provided for
in the clause.

It is the Court's prerogative t o determine whether there is an ambiguity in
the contract. If the Court should determine that the t w o interpretations put forth by
Defendants and Plaintiffs are both reasonable, then there is an ambiguity in the
contract, and Defendants would respectfully request t h a t summary judgment be
denied.

IV.
CONCLUSION
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Plaintiffs contend that there are three breaches of contract: t w o breaches of
the Master Agreement ( w i t h both Mr. Richards and the PEA, respectively), and one
breach o f the employment agreement between Defendants and Mr. Richards.
Plaintiffs' Memorandum, pp. 12 - 13. All three of these alleged breaches will be
resolved based on the interpretation of the professional leave clause. Defendants
contend that the clause gives Defendants the discretion t o determine what
constitutes professional leave and whether it should be granted. The plain language
of the clause supports this, allowing the Principal t o approve of granling such
leave. Further, the language in the Master Agreement regarding other types of
leave shows that they are mandatory, whereas the language for professional leave
is permissive. Therefore Plaintiffs have no right t o argue that there has been a
breach of contract when Defendants acted upon the discretion that they are given
under the clause, and as a result, have no right t o equitable relief. Defendants
respectfully request that Summary Judgment be denied.

DATED this

/6

?y

7

of June, 2008.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL

LLP

Attorneys for ~ Y f e n d a n t s
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